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On March 2, 1917, the 64th Congress passed a legislative package
creating a civil government for the territory of Puerto Rico.' As part of
the legislation, Congress included a provision exempting all bonds issued
by the Government of Puerto Rico from state and federal taxation.2 This
provision, codified in title 48 of the United States Code, section 745,
provides:
All bonds issued by the Government of Puerto Rico, or by its author-
ity, shall be exempt from taxation by the Government of the United
States, or by the Government of Puerto Rico or of any political or
municipal subdivision thereof, or by any State, Territory, or posses-
sion, or by any county, municipality, or other municipal subdivision of
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or by the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
3
Unlike similar federal exemptions for bonds issued by other territo-
ries 4 and by the United States,5 the language of the Puerto Rican statute
does not expressly extend to the interest income derived from these ex-
empt obligations. On its face, the language of section 745 exempts the
principal of Puerto Rican obligations from such taxation as a property or
other intangibles tax, 6 but sets forth no such provision for the interest.7
* Juris Doctor - 1992, Chicago-Kent College of Law, and Certified Public Account in Illinois
since 1986. I would like to thank Professor Stephen Sepinuck of Gonzaga University School of Law
and Professor Jonathan P. Tomes of Chicago-Kent College of Law for their assistance and support.
In addition, I would like to thank the 1991-92 Chicago-Kent Law Review editorial board and staff,
especially Mary Cameli, the Editor-in-Chief, and Sheryl Cohen, the Managing Editor, as well as
Mark Johnson, Editor-in-Chief for the 1992-93 academic year. Special thanks also go to Paul
Tomes.
1. H.R. 9533, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., 50 CONG. REc. 4810 (1917).
2. Id.
3. 48 U.S.C. § 745 (1917).
4. The federal statutes exempting Virgin Island and Guam obligations from state and federal
taxation, unlike section 745, expressly extend to the obligations' principal and interest. 48 U.S.C.
§ 1574 (1988) (formerly 48 U.S.C. § 1403 (1949)) and 48 U.S.C. § 1423a (1950).
5. A similar provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a), exempts obligations of the United States Govern-
ment from taxation by the federal government, a state, or a political subdivision of a state. With
certain exceptions, the § 3124(a) exemption "applies to each form of taxation that would require the
obligation, the interest on the obligation, or both, to be considered in computing a tax." 31 U.S.C.
§ 3124(a) (1982) (formerly 31 U.S.C. § 742).
6. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals in Dep't of Taxation and
Finance of N. J., 338 U.S. 665 (1950).
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As a result, state taxing authorities disagree concerning their ability to
tax the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations.8 For example, in
1989, Iowa announced that it was considering taxing the interest earned
by its taxpayers on Puerto Rican obligations. 9 In addition, other state
and territorial taxing authorities and legislatures,' 0 have enacted laws
and regulations which require the taxation of the interest derived from
Puerto Rican obligations.
While not all states agree with the actions taken by states like
7. 48 U.S.C. § 745 (1917).
8. N.Y. Personal Income Tax Computation of Income Residents, (CCH) 3122, n.60 (March
1989) (discussing Letter of Technical Services Bureau, Department of Taxation and Finance, to
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., (November 28, 1979)). "Obligations of Puerto Rico... are exempt
from taxation for New York State income tax purposes." Id. N.Y. [TAx] LAW § 612 (bX1), (2),
and (c)(1) (Consol. 1991).
However, the state of Arkansas imposes an income tax on the interest income derived from
Puerto Rican obligations. 26 ARK. STAT. ANN. CODE § 51-404 (6)(b) (Supp. 1991); Accord Tele-
phone Interview with David Foster, Arkansas Personal Income Tax Division, Arkansas Department
of Revenue (June 29, 1992).
9. Iowa officials are considering taxing the interest derived from Puerto Rican bond obliga-
tions. "The Iowa official, Jim Hamilton ... said that the rule change is under review because the
federal law [section 745] on Puerto Rico debt does not specifically exempt interest..." from taxation.
In addition, Hamilton also noted that similar statutes do. The statute granting the Virgin Islands the
authority to issue obligations expressly exempts not only the obligations principal from federal and
state taxation, but also the interest derived from the obligations. Yacoe, Iowa Considers Tax on
Puerto Rico Bonds Because of '72 Federal Tax Wording, The Bond Buyer, February 22, 1989, at 24.
One should note that Iowa while considering taxing the mentioned interest has, as of 1990, not
effectuated such a change. 23 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 422.7 and 422.35 (West 1990); see also Doran,
Puerto Rico Seeks New Bond Syndicates; Iowa Tables Proposal to Tax Island's Debt, The Bond
Buyer, March 15, 1989, at 2. Iowa set aside its proposal to tax the interest payments on Puerto
Rico's obligations, but Mr. Hamilton said that the proposal would probably be discussed again
sometime in the future. Id.
10. 26 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-404 (1991), the interest derived from obligations of the United
States or Arkansas is excluded from gross income. Id. § 51-404(6)(b). However, the interest derived
from the obligations of other states is not exempt. Id. In addition, "'[o]bligation of the United
States' means any U.S. government obligation used to finance the national debt.' ... The District of
Columbia is a U.S. possession, thus its obligations are exempt, but not those of Puerto Rico, because
the latter is an independent commonwealth." Ark. Personal Income Computation of Income, Inter-
est on Government Obligaitons, (CCH) 16-330 n.06 (1989) (quoting Akransas's former statute art.
lb.84-2008(2)(f)(1), Regs. 18-266); Accord Telephone Interview with David Foster, Arkansas Per-
sonal Income Tax Division, Arkansas Department of Revenue (June 29, 1992).
72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3402-307 (B) (1989) "Interest on obligations issued by other states
and territories, . . . shall be taxable." 61 PA CODE § 103.16(e) (1990).
67 TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-805(b)(1)(B) (1991), "There shall be added to the federal taxable
income: interest income from obligations defined in 26 U.S.C. § 103(a)(l)." This includes interest
derived from state obligations. 26 U.S.C. § 103(a)(1) (1986). In addition, Tennessee requires indi-
viduals to add back the interest income earned from Puerto Rican obligations as well as other states
because Tennessee defines state as including any state of the United States, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico and any territory or possession of the United States. 67 TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-
804(a)(7) (1991).
47 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1803.2(a)(1) (1991), "Interest [received] upon obligations of a state,
territory of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof, but not including District of
Columbia, shall be included in the computation of District gross income.., if such obligations are
purchased after December 31, 1991." Id.
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Iowa,"t Iowa's actions are not wholly unjustifiable. First, the federal
statute exempting Puerto Rican obligations from taxation is silent as to
the tax treatment of the income derived from such obligations. Next,
section 745 dates back to 1917, and in draft legislation back to 1916,
11. 43 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1021(4) (1991), Individuals and corporations must add to
their Arizona gross income "the amount of interest income received on obligations of any state,
territory or possession located outside the state of Arizona. However, individuals or corporations
may deduct the interest derived from the obligations of the United States to arrive at Arizona ad-
justed gross income. Id. § 1022(6). Commercial Clearing House has complied a list of the securities
Arizona includes as obligations of the United States. Ariz. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 10-425, 1259 (June
1989). This lists includes the principal and interest from bonds issued by the Government of Puerto
Rico.... Id. at n.55.B.2.
30 DEL. CODE ANN. ch. 11, § 1106(a) (1985). "There shall be added to federal adjusted gross
income: (1) a. interest qualifying under section 103 of the United States Internal Revenue Code of
1986 [26 U.S.C. § 103] or any similar statute[,] other than interest on obligations and securities of
this State .. " Id. § I 106(a)(l)a. However, Delaware exempts the interest received on obligations
if required by federal law. Id. § 1106(bXl). Thus, Delaware exempts the interest derived from
Puerto Rican bond obligations because the Attorney General improperly concluded that Puerto
Rico was still a dependent possession of the United States and, "therefore, specifically exempt under
the statute [48 U.S.C. § 745] .. " Del. Tax Rep. 15-415, 1603-04 (CCH) (March and September
1990), n.50 (discussing Mareno Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 68 (1st Cir. 1958);
ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 120 2-203(2)(0) (1989) (interest on federal obligations exempt by
Illinois Constitution, the United States Constitution, or federal statute Illinois's adjusted income.)
Id. Illinois Corporate Income Modifications to Federal Taxable Income, 11-154, 1399-1400 (CCH)
(July 1989). In addition, "[t]he Illinois Department of Revenue has stated in a bulletin that a federal
statute (31 U.S.C. § 742) exempts [the] interest [derived from] ... other U.S. obligations from Illi-
nois taxation. Ill. Tax Rep. (CCH) $ 11-154 (.12) (July 1989). "Other federal statutes provide ex-
emption from state income taxation with respect to various specifically named types of income.
Following is a list.., of exempt income .... Puerto Rico - Interest derived from bonds issued by
Government of Puerto Rico." Id. at n.12.II.l;
6 IND. CODE § 3-1-3.5(a) (Supp. 1990). Modifications to federal Adjusted Gross Income does
not include income exempt by federal statute when determining a taxpayer's Indiana taxable income.
Id. § 3-1-3.5(a). The following obligations and interest derived are exempt from Indiana income
taxation: "U.S. Possessions - Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, etc .... Ind. Tax Rep. (CCH) 16-
005(l)(a), 1802-1803 (Dec. 1984).
23 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 422.7 and 422.35 (West 1990), Individual's and corporation's Iowa
taxable income is calculated making modifications to the federal Adjusted Gross Income. Iowa law
provides: (1) "Subtract interest and dividends from federal securities." Id. §§ 422.7 and 422.35; (2)
"Add interest and dividends from foreign securities and from securities of state and other political
subdivisions exempt from federal income tax, under the Internal Revenue Code." Id. §§ 422.7 and
422.35. Iowa Admin. Code r. 701(422) was intended to implement § 422.35. "For corporate income
tax purposes, the state is prohibited by federal law form taxing... interest derived from obligations
of the United States and its possessions.... [W]idely held United States Government obligations [are
not taxed by Iowa]." Puerto Rico bonds are included in this list. Id. at r. 701(422) (interpreting 23
IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.35 (West 1990)).
While Iowa currently does not tax the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations, Iowa
recognizes that it has the authority to tax them and is considering changing its tax laws to include
this interest in taxable income. Yacoe, supra note 9, at 24.
57 OHio REV. CODE ANN. 5747.01 (A)(I)-(3) (Anderson Supp. 1991), Ohio exempts from
taxation the principle and interest of obligations of the United States, its territories or its possession.
Id.
Personal Income Computation of Income, List of Federal Government Obligations Exempt
From The Ohio Income Tax, 4195 (CCH) n.25(30) (July 1989), "As of July 25, 1987, the Ohio
Department of Taxation has confirmed the following federal obligations to be exempt from the Ohio
income tax .... U.S. Possessions - Obligations of Puerto Rico." Id.; New York, supra note 8.
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before most states had an enforceable income tax, and thus before Con-
gress may have been concerned with an income tax exemption. ' 2 Finally,
states have the power to tax their citizens and federally imposed limita-
tions on that power may be unconstitutional.'
3
Puerto Rico has more than nine billion dollars in outstanding obli-
gations in the United States,' 4 generating hundreds of millions of dollars
annually in interest income payable to investors.' 5 Because many states
currently do not tax the interest income derived from Puerto Rican obli-
gation, thousands of dollars of tax revenue are not available to state gov-
ernments.' 6 Thus, what may appear as a rather esoteric, academic or
arcane issue, is actually very important to the finance industry. Indeed,
at least two brokerage houses have established bond funds, which invest
solely in Puerto Rican obligations and "Puerto Rico was ranked 12th as
an issuer, selling a total of $2.53 billion, according to Securities Data
Co./Bond Buyer."1 7 The brokerage houses have marketed these funds to
12. J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION 6-7 (1987).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. 73, 80 (1850) (The Court held
that a Louisiana revenue act, which required "each and every money or exchange broker" to pay an
annual tax to the State of $250.00, "in lieu of the tax" previously imposed on them, was constitu-
tional. The Court found that the tax was not a tax on the exchange of money in interstate com-
merce, but rather tax on the business. "The right of a State to tax its own citizens ... or any
particular business or profession, within the State, has not been doubted.").
14. The Puerto Rican obligations outstanding in the United states account for approximately
74%) of the total outstanding Puerto Rican bonds.
TABLE 26*
GROSS PUBLIC DEBT OF PUERTO RICO:
FISCAL YEARS 1985-1989.
(FIGURES STATED IN THE BILLIONS.)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989"*
Commonwealth 2.040 2.199 2.553 3.067 3.312
Cities .235 .230 .357 .396 .428
Public Enterprises 6.562 6.694 7.232 7.774 &395
Total 8.837 9.123 10.143 11.237 12.135(1)
(1) 9/12.135 = 74% of Puerto Rico's total outstanding debt is held in the United States.
* Economic Development Administration - New York, appendix. 30 (Puerto Rico Chamber of
Comm. 1988) (citing statistics provided from the Government Development Bank of Puerto
Rico).
** 1989 figures are estimates based on an average increase of 108% calculated for the previous
years 1985-1988.
15. Yacoe, Puerto Rico Debt Seen to Face Crisis If Plan to Tax Bonds Becomes Widespread, The
Bond Buyer, February 23, 1989, at 1. Assuming an average coupon rate of 7%, the annual interest
income derived from these nine billion dollars in bonds is approximately $630 million.
16. Id. $630,000,000 times even a 2% tax rate times 45 states that have personal or corporate
income tax equals at least $56, 700,000 in lost tax revenues for the states.
17. Doran, Puerto Rico Seeks New Bond Syndicates; Iowa Tables Proposal to Tax Island's Debt,
The Bond Buyer, March 15, 1989, at 2.
Sears Tax-Exempt Investment Trust, Puerto Rico Municipal Portfolio Series 1, Prospectus
(1989).
This [Unit Investment] Trust [Bond Fund] was formed for the purpose of providing inter-
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the public with the understanding and representation that these funds
will be exempt from all federal and most states' taxation.18
Because the potential impact of state taxation of the interest derived
from Puerto Rican obligations affects not only Puerto Rico and the
states, but also the investor, this Note attempts to determine the proper
scope of section 745. First, the Note will examine the history of income
taxation in the United States surrounding the enactment of government
of Puerto Rico, as well as the current tax treatment of Puerto Rican
obligations among the fifty states. Next, the Note will analyze the impact
of state taxation of Puerto Rican obligations on Puerto Rico, the states,
and the investor. Next, this Note will identify the proper extent of the
Puerto Rican bond exemption, by examining the language and legislative
history of section 745, the background and legislative history of other
analogous United States statutes, and the relevant case law. This section
concludes that Congress never intended the section 745 exemption to ex-
tend to interest income. Finally, the Note analyzes whether Congress
has the constitutional power to prevent states from taxing the obligations
or the interest on the obligations of Puerto Rico and concludes that Con-
gress lacks this power.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 745
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power
"to lay and collect taxes.., to pay the debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States."1 9 During the Civil
War, Congress imposed various income taxes on the citizens of the
United States: the Act of July 1, 1862; the Act of June 30, 1864; the
Joint Resolution of July 4, 1864; the Act of March 3, 1865, amending the
Act of June 30, 1864; the Act of March 2, 1867; and the Act of July 14,
1870. In 187 1, the last of these income tax acts expired and Congress did
not attempt to institute another income tax until 1894.20 This attempt
failed, however, because the United States Supreme Court found that the
tax, which was a flat tax on the income derived from real property, from
est income which is excludable from gross income for Federal income tax purposes through
investment in a fixed portfolio consisting of investment grade intermediate-term Common-
wealth and public authority debt obligations. Additionally, interest income from the debt
obligations will not be subject, under current law, to personal state income taxes in sub-
stantially all states. The value of the Units of the Trust will fluctuate with the value of the
Portfolio of underlying Securities.
18. Franklin Puerto Rico Tax-Free Income Fund, Prospectus (July 1, 1989); Sears Tax-Exempt
Investment Trust, Puerto Rico Municipal Portfolio Series I, Prospectus (1989).
19. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1.
20. G.E. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 8 (1925).
1990]
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municipal bonds, and from corporations, was unconstitutional because
the Constitution required that Congress tax by apportionment.
21
Finally, Congress amended the Constitution by authorizing a federal
income tax without apportionment 22 when 36 of the 48 states ratified the
sixteenth amendment in until February 25, 1913.23 Congress enacted
several income taxes between 1913 and 1930,24 but these taxes were im-
posed on a very small percentage of the population, the very wealthy,
and were not permanent or stable.25 Consequently, the general public
was hardly affected by these taxes.26 However, on December 1, 1930, the
Joint Committee on the Internal Revenue Taxation codified the complete
and relatively permanent law of income taxation, which is the basis for
today's income tax.
27
In 1917, when Congress enacted the Civil Government of Puerto
Rico, following its ratification of the sixteenth amendment, but prior to
the Joint Committee's codification of the first permanent income tax
law,28 Congress provided a tax exemption for the bonds issued by Puerto
Rico, but failed to provide an express tax exemption for the interest de-
21. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (overruled on another point by
South Carolina v. Baker, 486 U.S. 505, 524 (1988)). The Court stated, while interpreting U.S.
Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 that, "Representative and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
states which may be included within this union according to their respective numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole number of free persons .... "
22. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration." U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
However in 1909, Congress did pass "a special excise tax on corporations with respect to the
carrying on or doing of business by such corporations." G.E. HOLMES, supra note 20, at 8. While
the Act of August 5, 1909 was not intended to tax the income of these corporations, the tax was
measured by the net income of the corporation. Id.
In addition, the Act of August 5, 1909 was held to be constitutional in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U.S. 107 (1911).
23. J. FREELAND, supra note 12, at 6-7.
24. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 25 (1916) (The Court held that a tax is not
unconstitutional simply because differences exist between the subjects to be taxed. Therefore, the
Revenue Act of 1913 is constitutional); the Revenue Act of September 8, 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, § 4,
758 (1916); La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377 (1921) (The Supreme Court held the
tax imposed by the Acts of March 3, 1917 on excess profits to be constitutional); United States v.
Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926) (The Supreme Court held the Act of February 24, 1919, to be constitu-
tional); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 454 (1928) (The Court upheld the Revenue Act of
1924 as constitutional under the Sixteenth amendment).
25. Congress imposed the early income taxes on a very small percentage of the population,
except when the United States was at war. From 1918 to 1932 an average of 5.6 percent of United
States citizens were subject to tax. The maximum coverage was 11.4 percent in 1920 and the mini-
mum percentage was 2.5 percent in 1931. Jones, Class Tax To Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda
in the expansion of the Income Tax During World War I1, 37 BUFFALO L. REv. 685, 688-689 (1988-
89).
26. Id. and J. FREELAND, supra note 12, at 6-7.
27. Id.
28. See supra, notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
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rived therefrom.29 Thus, a question exists as to the tax status of this
interest. The taxability of the interest derived from Puerto Rican obliga-
tions is inextricably related to congressional intention when it enacted
the organic laws of Puerto Rico and Puerto Rico's current constitutional
status as an unincorporated or incorporated territory.
Currently, several states do tax the principal and the interest derived
from Puerto Rican obligations, 30 notwithstanding a federal Internal Rev-
enue Service ruling that states that the interest income derived from Pu-
erto Rican obligations is exempt from federal taxation.31 The federal
government and many other states' legislation, which exempt interest
earned on Puerto Rican obligations, misinterpret section 745 and the
manner in which the Constitution affects congressional authority to en-
act legislation, dealing with Puerto Rico, such as section 745.32 The In-
ternal Revenue Service has ruled that interest income from Puerto Rican
obligations is exempt from federal taxation.33 While states are not bound
by federal revenue rulings when determining state income tax laws,
34
many states utilize the federal tax structure and rulings as a basis for
their own tax structure.
35
Many state taxing authorities have issued pronouncements indicat-
ing whether or not they tax the interest derived from Puerto Rican, terri-
torial, or United States possession's obligations. (See Table at the end of
Part II) For example, five states, Arkansas, Connecticut, Louisiana,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and the District of Columbia tax the interest
derived from Puerto Rican obligations 36 or tax the interest derived from
the interest arising from obligations of United States' territories and/or
possessions.
37
29. 48 U.S.C. § 745 (1917).
30. Supra, note 10.
31. Rev. Rul. 70-219, 1970-1 C.B. 23.
32. See infra note 314-330 and accompanying text.
33. All bonds issued by the Government of Puerto Rico, or by its authority, are exempt as to
principal and interest from taxation by the United States under section 3 of the Act of March 2,
1917, as amended by the Puerto Rican Relations Act (50 Stat. 843, 844; 48 U.S.C. § 745). Rev. Rul.
70-219,-1970-1 C.B. 23 (emphasis added).
34. Several states have no individual state tax. Infra note 40.
See Thomson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. 76 U.S. 579, 591 (1870) (the tenth amendment reserves
to the states the power to determine the taxation of its own citizens); Snow v. Dixon, 362 N.E.2d
1052 (Ill. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977) ("the power of the states... to levy and collect
taxes is unrestricted where such tax is not otherwise unconstitutional").
35. Several states base their taxable income figure on the individual's federal taxable or adjusted
gross income with modifications. CAL. TAX CODE §§ 17071, 17073, 17081, and 17131 (Supp. 1991);
23 IOWA CODE ANN §§ 422.7 and 422.35 (West 1990). See also supra notes 8, 10, 11, and infra
notes 37, 39, 41 and 49.
36. See supra note 10.
37. Id.; 12 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 506 (West Supp. 1990), Connecticut imposes a tax on
any one who earns or receives interest on any obligation, unless the taxpayer's adjusted gross income
1990]
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On the other hand, seven states, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Iowa, New York, and Ohio specifically exempt the interest derived
from Puerto Rican bonds from their state income tax. 38 Seventeen addi-
tional states, Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, and West Virginia, specifi-
cally exempt from taxation interest arising from obligations of any terri-
tory and/or possession, but do not specify whether the interest derived
Puerto Rico obligations is included in their list of territories and
possessions.
39
The remaining twenty-one states either do not have a personal in-
come tax4° or they do not have a specific provision, which adds back the
interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations to the states taxable in-
come, which generally is derived from federal taxable or adjusted gross
income. 41 As will be demonstrated by this Note, states that have ac-
is less than fifty four thousand dollars per year; 47 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287.71 A(2) (West Supp.
1990), "Interest or dividend income on obligations... issued by... the United States, its territories
or possessions .... should be added to Louisiana's taxable income.
38. Supra note 11.
39. The following states specifically exempt from taxation interest derived from obligations of a
United States territory and/or possession:
40 ALA. CODE § 18-14(2)d. (1990); 39 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-104(4)(a) (Supp. 1989); 48 GA.
CODE ANN. § 7-27(bXl)(B) (Supp. 1989); 79 KAN. STAT. ANN. art. 32, § 117 (a), (b)(i), and (c)(i)
(1989); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5122-2A (1978); 10 MD. TAX-GEN CODE ANN. § 207(c)
(Supp. 1990); 205 MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 133(b)(4) (1986); 27 Miss. CODE ANN. § 7-15(4)(d)
(1972); 143 Mo REV. STAT. § 121.3 1, 2(b), and 3(a) (Supp. 1990); 77 NEB. REV. STAT. § 2716(lXa)
(Supp. 1990); 54:8A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 36(b)(3XA) and (B) (West Supp. 1990); 2D N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-130.5(a)(4) and (bXl) (Supp. 1990); 57 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-01.2. 1. a. and 38-01.3
1. a. (Supp. 1991); 316 OR. REv. STAT. § 680(l)(a) (1987); 44 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-12(b)(1) and
(c)(1) (1989); 59 UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-114(2)(a) (Supp. 1991); 11 W. VA. CODE § 21-12(a) and
(c)(l) (Supp. 1991).
40. The following states do not have a personal or corporate income tax.
43 ALASKA STAT. §§ 19.010 (The definition of taxpayer does not include individual or person,
unless that person is "acting as a business entity in more than one state.") and 20.012 (1990); FLA.
STAT. §§ 220.13(1) and 220.131 (Supp. 1990); Nevada, Nevada Franchise and Income, 10-000, 501
(CCH); South Dakota, South Dakota Bank Income Tax, History of Tax, 10-002, 1075 (CCH)
(January 1988); Texas, Texas Income Tax (None Imposed), 603 (CCH) (March 1988); Washington,
Washington Income Tax (None), 701 (CCH) (February 1989); Wyoming, Wyoming Income Tax
(None), 701 (CCH) (January 1989).
41. The following states do not specifically discuss the tax status of the interest derived from
Puerto Rican obligations or the interest derived from obligations of United States territories or pos-
sessions:
CAL. TAX CODE §§ 17071, 17081, 17131, and 17133 (Supp. 1991); 14 HAW. REV. STAT. ch.
235, § 7(a)(l) and (6) (Supp. 1990); 63 IDAHO CODE § 3022(g) (Supp. 1991); 141 Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 010 (9) and (10)(a) (Michie/Bobb-Merrill 1991); 62 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 2(a)(l)(A)
and (2)(A) (West Supp. 1991); 19 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.01-19a(1) and 19b(l) (West Supp. 1991);
15 MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11 l(l)(a) and (2)(a) (1989); 5 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-2 and 4. I.
(1985); New Mexico Tax Computations of Income, Subtraction: Interest on U.S. Government Obli-
gations, 10-442, 1226 (CCH) (May 1988) (interpreting 31 U.S.C. § 3124); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
68, § 2358 A. 2. (West Supp. 1990); 12 S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-430(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
See also 62 S.C. CODE ANN. § 3-916(a)(4) (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5823 (a)(l)
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cepted the Internal Revenue Service's interpretations of section 745 and
are exempting the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations from
taxation are misinterpreting the extent of the section 745 exemption.
TABLE I
STATE TAX TREATMENT OF THE INTEREST DERIVED FROM PUERTO

















































































III. IMPACT ON INVESTORS, PUERTO RICO, AND THE STATES
The Congressional Record of the Senate debates over the Organic
Act of Puerto Rico sheds light on the issue of why Congress might have
intended to exempt these Puerto Rican bonds from taxation.43 First, the
o
(1990); 58 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1-302 A. & C. 1. and 322 C. 1. (1990); and 71 WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ .05(6)(b)(1) (1989).
42. See supra note 41. Many of these states utilize the federal taxable or federal adjustable
income to determine the state taxable income. Consequently, if the states do not provide a provision
adding the interest income derived from Puerto Rican obligations back into state taxable income, the
individual will not be taxed on that income in compliance with Revenue Ruling 70-219.
43. 50 CONG. REC. 2250 (1917). Senator Vardaman stated, "If the Senator from Ohio will
yield to me for a moment, in the consideration of this bill it was thought that this special exemption
should be given in order to make this security as attractive as possible."
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tax exemption has allowed Puerto Rico to sell the bonds at a lower rate
than the current market rate. The investor buys these bonds because the
investor receives a tax benefit which more than offsets the cost of invest-
ing in these lower yielding obligations." Thus, Puerto Rico and its mu-
nicipalities have been able to market their obligations as exempt from
state taxation, while state bond issuers have not generally had this privi-
lege.45 Second, Congress may have known that by making Puerto Rican
obligations and the interest derived therefrom exempt from state and fed-
eral taxation, Puerto Rico would owe investors less money in interest and
would, therefore, have more money to spend on improving the Puerto
Rican island." The issuer of any tax free bond has an advantage over the
issuers of non-tax exempt bonds. The issuer of tax free obligations is able
to sell the bonds at a lower interest rate than the issuer of taxable obliga-
tions, because investor does not need to make as much income to offset
the tax they must pay on taxable investments.47 Consequently, the issuer
of tax exempt obligations will have more funds to invest toward public
purposes, rather than to repay investors the additional interest necessary
to make the bonds competitive with other taxable obligations.
As will be detailed in this Note, however, Congress did not intend
the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations to be tax exempt and
even if it did section 745 is unconstitutional. Consequently, both the fed-
eral and state governments have the statutory and constitutional power
to tax and may start taxing the principal and the interest derived from
Puerto Rican obligations. To date, however, the federal government and
many state governments do not tax this interest and principal.48
Similarly, the federal government, and normally, the issuing state do
not tax the interest derived from state bonds.49 However, non-issuing
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting Senator Harding). "That is a provision that is not granted to any State in the
Union."
46. "Those people there are undeveloped, and it is for the purpose of enabling them to develop
their country to make the securities attractive by extending that exemption. It was thought by the
committee that it would probably be better for those people," Senator Vardaman replied to Senator
Harding's concerns. Id.
47. Id.; see also Donlan, The 51st State? A Fateful Choice Looms for Puerto Rico, Barron's,
September 3, 1990 at 17 (referring to section 936 and the impact of statehood on Puerto Rican
corporations ability to operate without tax consequences).
48. See supra notes 33, 38-41 and accompanying text.
49. See infra 221-237 and accompanying text.
Thirty-seven of the forty-three states, which have a personal income tax do not tax the interest
derived from their own obligations, but do tax the income derived from state obligations other than
their own.
40 ALA. CODE § 18-14(2)(f) (Supp. 1990); Arizona, supra note 11; Arkansas, supra note 10;
California, supra note 41; 39 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-104 (3)(b) (Supp. 1990); Connecticut, supra
note 37 (Connecticut also taxes the interests derived from its own obligations); 30 DEL. CODE ANN.
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states do tax the principal and interest earned by holders of other states'
obligations. 50 While many states tax the interest derived from other
states' obligations, the federal government does not, in part, to provide
state governmental institutions with a tool to borrow money at a lower
than market rate interest rate.51 "This [federal] interpretation is in ac-
cord with the long established congressional intent to prevent taxes
which diminish in the slightest degree the market value or the investment
§ 1106(a)(1)(a) (1985); 48 GA. CODE ANN. § 7-27(b)(1XA); 14 HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 235, § 7(bX2)
(Supp. 1990); 63 IDAHO CODE § 3022(a) (Supp. 1991); Iowa, supra note 11, "Add interest and divi-
dends from foreign securities and from securities of state and other political subdivisions exempt
from federal income tax, under the Internal Revenue Code." Id. §§ 422.7 and 422.35; 79 KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 32(a) and (b)(i) (1989); 141 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 010(OXc) (Michie/Bobb-Merrill
Supp. 1991); 47 LA. REV. STAT. 287.71 (A)(1) (West Supp. 1990); 62 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 2(a)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5122-IA (1978); 10 MD. TAX GEN.
CODE ANN. § 204(b) (Supp. 1989); 206 MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN. § 30(lXa) (1986); Minnesota,
supra note 41; Mississippi, supra § 7-(4Xd) and 15(1); Missouri, supra note 39; 15 MONT. CODE
ANN. § 30-111(l)(a) (1989); 77 NEB. REV. STAT. § 2716(1)(b) (Supp. 1990); 5 New Hampshire,
supra, note 41; 54:8A N.J. REV. STAT. § 36(bX2XA) (West Supp. 1990); 12 N.Y. (TAX] LAW
§ 612(b)(1) (Consol. 1991); 2D N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-130.5(a)(4) (Supp. 1990); 57 N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 38-01. 2. 1. g. and 38-01. 3. e. (Supp. 1989); 57 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.01(A)(1)
(Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2358 A. 1. (West Supp. 1990); 316 OR. REV. STAT.
§ 680(2)(a) and 317 OR. REV. STAT. § 309(1) (1987); Pennsylvania, supra note 10; 44 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 30-12(b)(1) (1989), "There shall be added to federal adjusted gross income: (1) Interest
income on obligations of any state, or its political subdivisions, other than Rhode Island or its polit-
ical subdivisions;" South Carolina, supra note 41; Tennessee, supra note 10; 58 VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 1-302 A., B. 1., C. 2., 1-322 B. 1. and C. 2. (Supp. 1990); 11 W. VA. CODE § 21-12(b)(1) (Supp.
1991).
Only six states also exempt from taxation the bonds and the interest derived therefrom of other
state obligations, as well as their own. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 2-203(2)(A); Indiana, supra note
11; 7 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-2(B) (1978); 59 UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-114 (Supp. 1991); Vermont,
supra note 41; 71 WIs. STAT. ANN. § .05(6Xa) 1. and (b) 1. (1989). Consequently, these states do
not discriminate between holders of holders of other state's property and holders of the taxing state's
property. Infra notes 238-255.
In addition, the District of Columbia is a territory which taxes the interest on obligations it
issues and the obligations of other states. See supra note 10. In addition, states have the power to
tax and do tax the principal and interest received by its citizens from obligations of the District of
Columbia as they tax the interest and principal derived from state obligations other than their own.
77 NEB. REV. STAT. § 2716(l)(b) (Supp. 1990) (Nebraska requires that taxpayers add back interest
or dividends received by the owner of obligations of the District of Columbia and other states of the
United States to the extent subtracted from federal adjusted gross income when calculating Ne-
braska's taxable income.)
50. Id.
51. Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111 (1944). In Smith, the court held that the state of Georgia
could tax the taxpayer's accounts receivable, which was a result of two contracts for work, labor,
and materials furnished to the United States Army. The taxpayer claimed that the tax was unconsti-
tutional because it was a tax on the credit of the United States and upon the federal government's
power to raise funds to operate military and civil organizations. Id. at 112-13. The court rejected
this argument because the accounts receivable were non interest bearing and were not obligations
used by the United States for credit purposes. However, the court indicated that had the debts of the
United States been interest bearing or had the United States issued the obligations for purposes of
obtaining credit, the debts or obligations would have been exempt from taxation if the tax interfered
with market value or the investment attractiveness of the debt or obligations. Id. at 112.
"The extent of this [taxes] influence depends on the will of a distinct government. To any
extent, however inconsiderable, it [the tax] is a burden on the operations of government. It may be
1990]
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attractiveness of obligations issued by the United States in an effort to
secure necessary credit."
5 2
Consequently, while the federal government has the statutory and
constitutional authority to tax both Puerto Rican obligation principal
and the interest derived therefrom, the federal government would be un-
likely to tax such obligations or interest. This seems more apparent
when one considers that, if the federal government were to tax the princi-
pal and the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations, it would then
have to increase the aid to Puerto Rico to make up for the difference
between the taxable and tax exempt interest rates that Puerto Rico would
have to pay investors. The states however, have no such disincentive in
taxing Puerto Rican obligations and the interest derived therefrom.
Next, if the states were to exercise their statutory and constitutional
rights to tax the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations, what
would be the impact on the taxpayer, on Puerto Rico, and on the states?
First, the taxpayer will incur state taxation on all income derived from its
holdings in Puerto Rican obligations, as well as possible state intangibles
taxes. Because 48 U.S.C. § 745 is unconstitutional, taxpayers may find
themselves holding bonds whose interest will be taxable by the state in
which the taxpayer lives. Gross income and exclusions are defined by the
state and federal revenue and taxing codes.5 3 Almost no one is able to
avoid the income tax today. The mere fact that an investment was tax
exempt at the time the taxpayer invested in it does not preclude the state
or federal governments from taxing the income derived from the invest-
ment at a later date. "The income tax (with all its changes) may be the
price of our civilization. 5
4
Second, the impact on Puerto Rico will be more than slight. If the
interest derived from Puerto Rican bonds does not remain exempt from
federal and state taxation, Puerto Rico would still be able to raise funds
to finance public projects. However, Puerto Rico would need to increase
the yield it pays investors between .8 and 3.88 percent in order to com-
carried to an extent which shall arrest them [state bond issues] entirely," Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (quoting Weston v. City Council, 2 Pet. 449, 468 (1829)).
See also New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals in Dept. of Taxation and
Finance of N.J., 338 U.S. 665 (1950).
In recent years the Court has recognized that the tax exempt status for federal debt and obliga-
tions does not exist as long as the state tax is nondiscriminatory. See supra notes 237-54 and accom-
panying text.
52. Id.
53. 26 U.S.C. sec. 61 (1986) and various state regulations.
54. C.F. MCCARTHY, B.M. MANN, B.M. ABBIN, W. H. GREGORY, AND J. P. LINDGREN, THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX; ITS SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS 12 (1967).
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pete with corporate or other taxable municipal bonds, 55 which will in-
crease the cost of each issue. While any of these scenarios place some
economic burden on Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court has held that such
economic burdens have an indirect and incidental affect.56 Conse-
quently, absent constitutional actions by Congress, no implied or statu-
tory tax immunity can be afforded a government such as Puerto Rico. 57
Finally, state taxation of interest derived from Puerto Rican obliga-
tions would provide states with additional revenue to repair roads, build
needed facilities, pay state employees, as well as provide funds for many
other public projects.58
As is apparent from this brief discussion, pros and cons exist for
providing a tax exemption for the interest derived from Puerto Rican
bonds. However, Congress has not expressly provided such an exemp-
tion and without express congressional intent to exempt the interest de-
rived from governmental obligations no tax immunity can be implied. 59
Further, the Supreme Court has held that states and federal governments
do not need to extend tax-exemptions to claims or to obligations, which
the United States does not use or need for credit purposes.6° As this
Note will discuss, Puerto Rico is an incorporated territory for congres-
sional regulatory purposes, which requires Congress to treat Puerto Rico
more like a state than an division of the federal government. 61 Conse-
quently, Puerto Rican obligations, as state obligations, are no longer con-
sidered for United States credit purposes, and thus, should not be given
discriminatory tax exempt status. Barring any possible unfairness to Pu-
erto Rican bond issuers and investors, inherent in a change in the obliga-
55. Puerto Rican obligations, for which the principal and the interest derived are generally
exempt from both state and federal income tax, yield about 6.87% and 7.30% for 20 and 30 year
obligations, respectively. Puerto Rican Government Public Improvement 30 year obligations yield
7.29% interest, with a coupon rate of 7.30%, and traded Puerto Rican 20 year obligations yield
6.87% interest, with a coupon rate of 7.125%. Barons, April 8, 1991 at 100; and Wall Street Jour-
nal, April 8, 1991 at C21.
United States obligations, for which both the principal and the interest derived are also exempt
from both state and federal income tax. See 31 U.S.C. § 3 124(a). United States Treasury Zero
Coupon Strip Bonds yield 7.84% interest for 30 year bonds. Barrons, April 8, 1991 at 139.
However, similar corporate obligations, which are not tax exempt, yield a much higher interest
rate. Barron's Best Grade 30 year bonds yield 8.50 - 10.00% and Barron's Intermediate-Grade 30
year bonds yield 9.95%. Id. at 139. Corporate obligations yield from 9.008 - 10.750% with coupon
rates ranging from zero to 11.875% for 15-40 year obligations. Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1991 at
C21.
56. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515-17 (1988); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas
Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365 (1949); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
57. Id.
58. Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 117 (1944).
59. Graves, 306 U.S. at 487.
60. Id.
61. See infra notes 256 - 313 and accompanying text.
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tions tax status, the need for states to exercise their full power of taxation
must overrule any rationale used by Congress to dominate such taxing
power. Consequently, Congress should not be allowed to sacrifice the
states' ability to raise revenue under the cloak of assistance to another
federal possession when in fact Puerto Rico is an incorporated territory
for which the entire Constitution applies.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENTION
Congress did not intend to exempt the interest derived from Puerto
Rican obligations from either state or federal taxation. First, the lan-
guage of a statute is controlling, absent contradictory or explanatory leg-
islative history. When Congress grants a tax exemption for the
obligations, this exemption refers only to the principal absent Congres-
sional language or legislative history to the contrary. Congress must ex-
plain its intentions for the application of the statute in the language of the
statue or in the legislative history of the statute. If Congress does not act
affirmatively, the Constitution does not imply an income tax exemption
for state or federal property. Second, Congress indicated, in the Con-
gressional debates over the enactment of the Puerto Rican civil govern-
ment act, that the Puerto Rican act was to be modeled after the statute
Congress enacted granting a civil government to the Philippine Islands.
Congress did not exempt the interest derived from Filipino obligations or
indicate that it wanted to change the tax provision of the Filipino act.
Therefore, Congress could not have intended to exempt the interest de-
rived from Puerto Rican obligations and courts should not infer such an
exemption. Third, Congress exempted the interest derived from United
States possessions' obligations in the Revenue Act of 1916, but did not
include the same exemption language in section 745, which Congress en-
acted one year later. In addition, in similar statutes dealing with obliga-
tions issued by other United States territories, such as the Virgin Islands,
and Guam, Congress specifically exempted the interest derived from
these obligations, but did not amend section 745 to provide the same
language for the obligation and the interest derived from Puerto Rico
obligations. Finally, courts have found section 745 to be similar to sec-
tion 3124(a), which exempts United States' obligations from taxation, but
have not inferred that the interest income taxation exemption provided
for in section 3124(a) would also apply to section 745.
A. The Language of Section 745
When Congress grants a tax exemption for the obligations, this ex-
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emption refers only to the principal absent statutory language or legisla-
tive history to the contrary. Should Congress intend that tax exemption
to extend to the interest derived from the obligation, then Congress must
explain its intentions in the statutory language or the legislative history
of the statute. In addition, if Congress does not expressly require,
through the statute, the Constitution will not imply an income tax ex-
emption for state or federal property.
Unlike similar federal statutes exempting obligations of the United
States or its territories from income taxation of the interest derived there-
from,62 section 745 does not expressly exempt the interest derived from
Puerto Rican obligations. 63 It merely exempts the obligations themselves
from taxation. 64 Courts have interpreted similar statutory language to
exempt governmental obligations from state property tax. In American
Bank and Trust Co. v. Dallas County,65 the Texas Tax Commissioner
levied a property tax on the American Bank and Trust Company's state
and national shares of United States obligations for the years 1979 and
1980. 66 The Texas Tax Commissioner computed the tax based on each
bank's net assets without deducting the value of United States obligations
held by the bank.67 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals upheld the tax. 68
On appeal, American Bank, relying on the amended language of sec-
tion 3701,69 sought a mandamus barring the state from taxing the bank's
shares in U.S. obligations.70 In addition, the bank sought declaratory
and injunctive relief asserting that the value of their bank's shares should
be reduced by the proportionate value of their United States
obligations.7
1
In analyzing the amended language of § 3701, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the tax imposed by the tax commissioner. The
Court held that the exemption provided in section 3701,72 which exempts
62. 48 U.S.C. § 1574 (1988) (formerly 48 U.S.C. § 1403 (1949); 48 U.S.C. § 1423a (1950).
63. 48 U.S.C. § 745 (1917).
64. Id.
65. 463 U.S. 855 (1985).
66. Id. at 862.
67. Id. at 859-60.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 860 (referring to Rev. Stat. § 3701, codified at 31 U.S.C. 3124(a) (1982) (formerly 31
U.S.C. § 742)).
[AllI stocks, bonds, treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States shall be ex-
empt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority. This exemption
extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the
interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the
tax. Id. n.1 (1983).
70. Id. at 860.
71. Id.
72. Codified at 31 U.S.C. 3124(a) (1982) (formerly 31 U.S.C. § 742)).
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United States obligations from any form of state taxation, exempted such
obligations from a state property tax.73 First, the court reasoned that the
language of the statute provided an exemption from any form of taxation
for the United States obligations.7 4 The commissioner argued that a tax
which only considers the taxpayers holdings in government obligations is
an indirect tax on the taxpayer's privilege of doing business in Texas,
rather than a direct tax on the taxpayers assets. However, the Supreme
Court did not agree. The Court recognized that a tax on a company's
holdings in governmental obligations was a tax on that company's assets
and the principal of the obligations. 75 The Court stated that a tax which
"considers" the obligations in the computation of the tax is a tax on the
ownership of an asset, and therefore, a direct tax on the obligations.7 6 In
addition, the language of the statute bars a tax which "considers" the
obligations in the computation of the tax. Consequently, the tax imposed
by the commission, which considered the bank's holdings in government
obligations in violation of the express language of the statute and there-
fore, was not an implied exemption.
77
Second, the Court reasoned that "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legis-
lative intention to the contrary, [the statutory] language must ordinarily
be regarded as conclusive."7 Had the statute or legislative history indi-
cated that Congress did not intend to exempt the obligation (principal)
from a state property tax, the Court would not have allowed the bank to
deduct its United States obligations from its net assets when calculating
its state property tax liability. The Court stated "[iun these circum-
stances, the plain language of sec. 3701 is controlling. '79
73. In 1959, Congress amended section 3701 to specifically include the property tax exemption.
"This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligation or
the interest thereon, or both, be considered, direct or indirectly, in the computation of the tax ......
The Supreme Court interpreted this to include a property tax exemption and held that the plain
language of section 3701, as amended, was not contradicted by its legislative history and was not
inconsistent with any federal statute, therefore the property tax exemption was valid. American
Bank & Trust Co., 463 U.S. at 862 and 873.
74. Id. at 862.
75. Id. at 863.
76. Id. at 862-64.
Giving the words of amended § 3701 their ordinary meaning, there can be no question that
federal obligations were considered in computing the bank shares tax at issue here. In
context, the word 'considered' means taken into account, or included in the accounting.
The tax at issue was computed by use of an 'equity capital formula,' which involved deter-
mining the amount of bank's capital assets, subtracting from that figure the bank's liability
and the assessed value of the bank's real estate, and then dividing the result by the number
of shares. Plainly, such a tax takes into account, at least indirectly, the federal obligations
that constitute a part of the bank's assets. Id. at 863 (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 864.
78. Id. at 862 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
108 (1980)).
79. Id. at 873.
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Similarly, in New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Ap-
peals in Dep't of Taxation and Finance,0 a New Jersey tax commission
levied an assessment against the intangible personal property of New
Jersey Realty Title Insurance Company. The tax was computed on the
realty title company's paid-up capital and surplus without deducting the
company's holdings in United States bonds. 8' The Supreme Court held
that such a tax is a tax on the principal of the obligations and not a tax
on the income of the obligations.8 2 The Court reasoned that such a tax is
in violation of the express language of section 3701, which exempts the
United States obligations from taxation.8 3
While section 745 deals with corporate or individual holdings in Pu-
erto Rican obligations, rather than United States government obligations
courts should also find that the language of section 745, which exempts
the obligations from state taxation, expressly exempts the principal of
Puerto Rican obligations from state taxation.
In addition, the Supreme Court has held that when a statute ex-
empts an obligation's principal from taxation, the Constitution does not
imply an automatic exemption for the interest derived therefrom, unless
Congress affirmatively indicates such an exemption through the statute's
language or legislative history.84 As discussed earlier, when Congress
enacted section 745, similarly to when it enacted other federal statutes, it
exempted the principal of the obligation from state taxation. However,
unlike the exemptions Congress has provided in other statutes, Congress
did not provide an express tax exemption for the interest income derived
from Puerto Rican obligations when it enacted section 745. Thus, fol-
lowing the Court's interpretation of the Constitution, courts should not
imply a congressional intention to exempt the interest derived from Pu-
erto Rican obligations.
The Court did not always refuse to imply congressional intention to
exempt United States property and the income derived therefrom from
taxation.8 5 In 1927, the Supreme Court held that when the Constitution
or Congress provide a tax exemption for the principal of United States
obligations, this exemption automatically extends to the interest income
80. 338 U.S. 665 (1950).
81. Id. at 666.
82. A tax on capital and earned surplus is a tax "imposed on the property of the institutions, as
contradistinguished from a tax upon their privileges or franchises," which are based on the tax-
payer's net income. Id. at 673-74.
83. Id. at 675-76.
84. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515-517 (1988); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas
Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365 (1949); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
85. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 136, 140 (1927); Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 505-6 (1922); Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1885).
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derived from such obligations.8 6 In Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Co., the Court held that if the principal of United States obligations is
exempt from taxation, the interest income derived is automatically ex-
empt from any form of income or franchise tax.87 The court reasoned to
do otherwise would place a direct burden on the governmental entity's
property, which violates the Constitution. 88
The Court has never expressly overruled Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Co. However, the Supreme Court did overrule Gillespie v.
Oklahoma,89 the case that Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. was
based on in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co. 9 In Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, the court held that no implied constitutional immunity exists
for the income derived from property leased from the United States as
suggested in Gillespie.9 The Court explained that Congress may have
the power to immunize or exempt such income from Oklahoma taxation,
but for Congress to create such an immunity or exemption, Congress
must take "affirmative action."'92 In addition, the court found that the
law was well settled that such land has been and should be subject to all
state and local ad valorem taxes.93
The Court reasoned that despite the possibility that a state tax may
reduce the amount the federal government may receive for the sale of
property, the reduced price will be too de minimis and remote to ad-
versely impact the government. 94 The Court reasoned that, contrary to
86. "[I]t has been the settled doctrine here that where the principle is absolutely immune, no
valid tax can be laid upon income arising therefrom. To tax this would amount practically to laying
a burden on the exempted principle." Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U.S.
136, 140 (1927).
87. 275 U.S. at 140 (relying on Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 505-56 (1922) ("[W]here
the principal is absolutely immune from interference an inquiry is allowed into the sources from
which net income is derived and if a part of it comes from such source the tax is pro tanto void.")).
88. 275 U.S. at 140-41.
89. 257 U.S. 501 (1922). In Gillespie v. Oklahoma, the court held that the state of Oklahoma
could not tax the income earned by the defendant in pursuit of his business, which was located on
property the defendant leased from the United States. Id. at 505 (relying on Pollock v. Farmer's
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)). The court held that because a tax on the lease principal
was "a tax upon the power [of the United States] to make them, and could be used to destroy the
[United States'] power to make them" a tax on the income derived from such leased property would
likewise destroy the United States, and other sovereigns, ability to contract such leases. Id. at 505-56
(quoting Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522, 530 (1916)).
"[A] tax upon the profits of the leases, and, stopping short of theoretical possibilities, a tax upon
such profits is a direct hamper upon the effort of the United States to make the best terms that it can
for its wards." Id. at 506 (referring to Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 468 (1829)).
90. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365 (1949), reh'g denied, 336 U.S. 958
(1949).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 366.
93. Id. at 353. Such property is subject to taxes based on the value of the property.
94. Id. at 354.
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the holding in Gillespie, the burden placed on the federal government by
such taxes is too remote and indirect to justify an implied tax immunity
for the purchasers and subsequent holder of such property.95 The pro-
spective buyer of governmental land or the private individual who uses
land to perform services for the United States, will pay the government a
fair price for the land based on the prospective profitability of the land,
rather than state property tax.
96
Similarly, in Graves v. New York ex reL O'Keefe97 the Court held
that the State of New York had the power to tax the salaries of national
governmental employees because Congress had not expressly exempted
these items from taxation. 98 The Court held that "[s]ilence of Congress
implies [tax] immunity no more than does the silence of the Constitu-
tion.... [consequently, if Congress does act,] Congress has disclosed no
intention" to exempt what the Constitution does not.99 The Court rea-
soned no basis exists for the assumption that the economic burden im-
posed on the federal government would justify any court declaring the
employee taxpayer to be clothed with the implied constitutional tax im-
munity of the government by which she is employed. to
While the burden of a nondiscriminatory tax on the incomes of fed-
eral or state government employees will be passed back to the employer,
the government, in the form of increased salaries to compensate the em-
ployee for the tax, such a burden is "the normal incident of the organiza-
95. Id.
Despite the possibility that the prospect of taxation by the state may reduce the amount the
United States might receive from the sale of its property [to a private individual], it is well
established that property purchased from the Federal Government becomes a part of the
general mass of property in the state and must bear its fair share of the expenses of local
government. Id. at 353.
96. Id. at 354.
97. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
98. Id. at 486.
99. Id. at 480.
It is true that the silence of Congress, when it has authority to speak may sometimes give
rise to an implication as to Congressional purpose. The nature and extent of that implica-
tion depend upon the nature of the Congressional power and the effect of its exercise.
(Referring in footnote 1 to the dormant commerce clause, Congress does not regulate com-
merce. Therefore, until it does, States have the authority to regulate commerce). But there
is little scope for the application of that doctrine to the tax immunity of governmental
instrumentalities. The constitutional immunity of either government from taxation by the
other, where Congress is silent, has its source in an implied restriction upon the powers of the
taxing government [not the taxed government]. So far as the implication rests upon the
purpose to avoid interference with the functions of the taxed government or the imposition
upon it of the economic burden of the tax, it is plain that there is no basis for implying a
purpose of Congress to exempt the federal government or its agencies from tax burdens
which are unsubstantial or which courts are unable to discern. Id. at 479-80.
100. Id. at 486. "That assumption ... is contrary to the reasoning and to the conclusions
reached in the Gerhardt case" and in several other cases. "In their light the assumption can no
longer be made." Id. (citations omitted).
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tion within the same territory of two governments, each possessing the
taxing power."'' ° In addition, the effect on the employer is indirect and
incidental. Therefore, the Court reasoned that it could not rightly imply
a tax immunity to the government employer or the employee when the
Constitution has expressly granted the power of taxation to the federal
government and has reserved that the power of taxation to the states.
0 2
For many years the Supreme Court has limited the reach of the in-
tergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, but until recently had not ap-
plied these limitations to federal and state obligations. 0 3 In 1988, the
Supreme Court held that no implied tax immunity exists for holders of
state obligations, 0 4 thus overruling its holding in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. '05 In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., the Court
held that a tax levied on the income derived from municipal real estate
and bonds interfered with the municipalities' ability to sell bonds and
make contracts, and therefore, was an indirect tax on the municipality. 0 6
Such a tax interfered with the municipality's intergovernmental tax im-
munity, and consequently, was unconstitutional. 0 7
As previously stated, the Supreme Court overruled Pollock in 1988
in South Carolina v. Baker.08 The Court in Baker stated that it saw
no constitutional reason for treating persons who receive interest on
governmental bonds differently than persons who receive income from
other types of contracts with the government, and no tenable rationale
101. Id. at 487.
102. Id. "The immunity is not one to be implied from the Constitution, because if allowed it
would impose to an inadmissible extent a restriction on the taxing power which the Constitution has
reserved to the state governments." Id.
103. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). "The rationale underlying... the general
immunity for governmental contract income has been thoroughly repudiated by modern intergov-
ernmental immunity caselaw." Id. at 520. "Likewise, the owners of state bonds have no constitu-
tional entitlement not to pay taxes on the income they earn from [governmental] bonds." Id. at 524-
25.
104. Id. at 1367 ("[w]e thus confirm that subsequent caselaw has overruled the holding in Pol-
lock that state bond interest is immune from a nondiscriminatory federal tax.")
105. 157 U.S. 429 (1885). The Court stated that a tax on the income of United States property is
a tax on the property itself, and is therefore a direct tax. Id. at 580-81 (relying on its holding in
Weston v. City Council, 2 Pet. 449, 465-69 (1829)). Referring to Weston, the Court stated "a tax on
the income of United states securities was a tax on the securities themselves, and [such a tax is]
equally inadmissible." Id. The Court held that under the constitution the federal and state govern-
ments could not levy direct tax without apportionment. Id.
The Courts reasoning in Pollock was the basis for its decision in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257
U.S. 501, 505-56, which as discussed earlier was the Court's basis for Northwestern Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 136 (1927).
106. Id. at 585-86.
107. Id.
108. 485 U.S. 505, 515-517, 523-24 (1988).
In addition, following the passage of the sixteenth amendment in 1913, the Constitution no




for distinguishing the costs imposed on States by a tax on state bond
interest from the costs imposed by a tax on the income from any other
state contract. 109
The Court reasoned that "under [the] current intergovernmental tax im-
munity doctrine" state governments can not tax the United States di-
rectly, but have the constitutional authority to tax any private individual
or association with whom the federal government does business, even
though some of the financial burden will fall on the United States.1 0 A
state tax on private individuals is an indirect tax and does not violate the
Constitution. Only a direct tax on the federal government would inter-
fere with the federal governments intergovernmental tax immunity. The
Court stated that a direct tax is one that falls on the United States it-
self."' Similarly, with certain exceptions "[tihe rule with respect to state
tax immunity is essentially the same."'"1
2
Consequently, while Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. has
not been directly overruled, the basis for the Court's reasoning that the
Constitution provides an implied immunity from taxation for govern-
mental obligations and the interest derived therefrom, without Congres-
sional action, has been repeatedly overruled and is no longer accepted." 3
Thus, the Court should not imply an exemption from taxation for the
interest derived from any obligation unless Congress expressly grants the
interest such an exemption, even if Congress has granted such an exemp-
tion to the principal of the obligation.
The language of section 745 provides for the exemption of Puerto
Rican obligations from all forms of taxation. Courts should interpret
this, absent legislative history to the contrary, to exempt only the princi-
pal of Puerto Rican obligations from taxation. In contrast, Congress did
not provide section 745 or section 745's legislative history with language
which would exclude the interest derived from the Puerto Rican obliga-
tions from any form of taxation. Because the Supreme Court has re-
jected its early constitutional reasoning that United States and state
obligations are impliedly exempt from taxation, without affirmative ac-
tion by Congress, courts cannot imply a congressional intention to ex-
empt such interest.
109. Baker, 485 U.S. at 524-25.
110. Id. at 523.
111. Id.
112. Id. A federal tax which discriminates for holders of federal property or contracts over
holders of state property or contracts may be allowed. However, a parallel state tax could not be
imposed on holders of federal property or contracts, unless a similar tax was imposed on holders of
similar state property or contracts. Id. at 526.
113. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365 (1949); Graves v. New York ex rel
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
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B. Legislative History of Puerto Rican and Filipino Statutes
The legislative hearings held by Congress before enacting the Or-
ganic Government of Puerto Rico do not contradict the language of sec-
tion 745,114 which further indicates that Congress did not intend to
extend the exemption provided in section 745 to the interest derived from
Puerto Rican obligations. On January 20, 1916, Congressman Jones1 15
presented Congress with a bill,116 which detailed the rules for the pro-
posed government of Puerto Rico. Section 3 of the bill granted Puerto
Rico the power to issue "bonds and other obligations." 17 Section 3 also
exempted such obligations 1 8 from state and federal taxation.119 On
March 3, 1917, Congress adopted the bill' 20 and codified section 3 in title
48.121
While Congress did not indicate whether this exemption was to be
limited to intangible taxes on the principal or whether it also extended to
the interest income derived from the obligations, Congress indicated that
section 3 of the Jones Act was to be similar to the like provision in the act
114. H.R. 9533, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 49 CONG. REC. 1340 (1916).
115. Congressman Jones was from Virginia. Id.
116. The bill was approved by the Insular Affairs Committee before Congressman Jones
presented it to the entire Congress. Id.
117. [A]nd when necessary to anticipate taxes and revenues, bonds and other obligations
may be issued by Porto [sic] Rico or any municipal government therein as may be provided
by law, and to protect the public credit: Provided, however, That no public indebtedness
of Porto (sic] Rico or of any municipality thereof shall be authorized or allowed in excess
of 7 per cent of the aggregate tax valuation of its property, and all bonds issued by the
government of Porto [sic] Rico or by its authority shall be exempt from taxation by the
Government of the United States, or by the government of Porto [sic] Rico or of any
political or municipal subdivision thereof, or by any State, or by any county, municipality,
or other municipal subdivision or any State or Territory of the United States, or by the
District of Columbia. Id. at 8424 (emphasis added).
118. H.R. 9533, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., 50 CONG. REC. 2250 (1917). Congress intended the ex-
emption of Puerto Rican obligations to include a property tax exemption on the principal of the
obligations. The Court has held that statutes indicating that the obligation is tax exempt include the
tax associated with an intangible property tax. See American Bank and Trust Co. v. Dallas County,
463 U.S. 855, 862 (1983) and New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. New Jersey, 336 U.S. 665 (1950).
119. The debates and committee hearings occupy over 1000 pages of congressional record, how-
ever, the discussion of the meaning and significance of the bond exemption provision is approxi-
mately two paragraphs.
Mr. Harding. "I wish to ask the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Shafroth] a question in rela-
tion to this section. Is it the intention of the sponsors of the bill to exempt all the subdivi-
sion and municipal bonds from Federal and State taxation?"
Mr. Shafroth. "I think that is the provision of the law."
Mr. Harding. "That is a provision that is not granted to any Sate in the Union."
Mr. Shafroth. "It may be, but it is the same provision that we have extended to the Philip-
pine Islands." 50 CONG. REc. 2250 (1917).
120. Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922), the adopted bill has been commonly re-
ferred to as the Jones Act and the Jones Act "provide[d] a civil government for Porto [sic] Rico."
Id.
121. 48 U.S.C. § 745 (1917).
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creating the government for the Philippine islands, enacted in 1902.122
When Congress granted the Philippine Islands their civil government, it
also authorized the government of the Philippine Islands with an avenue
to incur indebtedness, borrow money, and to issue and sell registered or
coupon bonds. 123 In addition, Congress provided that such bonds will be
"payable... together with the interest.., and said bonds shall be exempt
from the payment of all taxes or duties of the government of the said
Islands, or. . . of the Government of the United States."' 24
However, when the Filipino bill was first presented to the entire
Congress it provided that Philippine obligations would be exempt from
not only federal taxes, but also state taxes. During the Congressional
debates, one Congressman questioned whether Congress had the power
to exempt bonds issued by the Philippines from state taxation. 25
Although Congress never specifically answered this question in the many
pages of Congressional debates, 126 Congress either intentionally or inad-
vertently dropped from the language of the actual statute the provision
exempting these obligations from state taxation.
27
As indicated from the language of the Filipino act, Congress in-
tended to exempt the Filipino bonds from federal intangible property tax-
122. H.R. 9533, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., 50 CONG. REc. 2249 (1917). During the Senate debates
concerning section 3 of the Puerto Rican Civil Government bill Senator Shafroth, the initiator of the
house bill before the Senate, stated "We have here exactly the same that was allowed in the Philip-
pines bill." Id.
The United States created the Filipino territorial government following the Spanish Indian
War. S. 2295, 57th Cong., 1st, 35 CONG. REc. 6082 (1902).
123. July 1, 1902, Pub. L. No. 235, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 66-72, 706-708 (1902).
124. Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
125. Mr. Bacon. "I should like to ask the Senator from Massachusetts whether the committee
has considered the question of the right of Congress to exempt from taxation in the States bonds
issued by the government of the Philippine Islands?"
Mr. Lodge. "The committee have [sic] considered that question, that point having been raised,
and the committee were of opinion that, as we have made similar exemptions in cases of bonds in
Territories, we were at liberty to do so in this case."
Mr. Bacon. "The Senator will note, Mr. President, that the question of precedent would not
control that matter, unless it be a precedent set by the Supreme Court .. "
Mr. Lodge then acknowledged that the Mr. Bacon's concern would be addressed at a later date.
However, the Congress did not discussed this issue further. S. 2295, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 35 CONG.
REc. 6082 (1902).
126. Id. at 123-6092.
127. The legislative history indicates that the Congressional committee intended to exempt at
least the obligations issued by the Filipino government from state taxation.
[B]onds shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes or duties of the government of the
Philippine Islands or any local authority therein, or of the Government of the United
States, as well as from taxation in any form by or under State... in the United States or the
Philippine Islands.
Id. at 6082 (emphasis added). But Congress did not include the last line of the above quote in the
actual statute. Philippine Islands Temporary Civil Government Act of July 1, 1902, Pub. L. No.
235, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 72, 708 (1902).
19901
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ation. 128 However, Congress indicated that it did not intend to exempt
the interest derived from these obligations from either federal or state
taxation.1 29 First, the language of the Filipino act Congress specifically
said that the interest, along with the principal, should be paid to the
investors, but failed to mention interest when exempting the bond from
taxation.130 Second, when Congress enacted the government for the
Philippine Islands, Congress understood that taxation of interest income
was possible. While only one state and one territory had an income tax
when Congress enacted the government for the Philippine Islands, 131
several federal income taxes had been in effect since the mid 1800's.132
Finally, Congress did not purport to exempt the interest derived from
Filipino obligations from state taxation.1 33
When Congress enacted both the Filipino and Puerto Rican bond
provisions, it was well aware of the possibility that federal and state gov-
ernmental bodies would consider taxing not only the principal of a gov-
ernmental obligation, but also the interest income derived therefrom.13 4
Because Congress did not exempt the interest income derived from Fili-
pino obligations from state or federal taxation and Congress indicated
that the Filipino act was the model for the Jones Act, Congress could not
have intended to extend the federal or state tax exemption of section 745
to the interest derived from the Puerto Rican obligations.
Had Congress intended to exempt the interest derived from Puerto
Rican obligations from state and federal taxation, Congress should have
indicated in the Jones Act's legislative history or in the statutory lan-
guage of section 745 an intention to modify the tax exemption provision
of the Filipino Act, which Congress expressly relied on. At best,
Congress did not affirmatively manifest an intent to make such a
modification.
128. See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
129. Philippine Islands Temporary Civil Government Act of July 1, 1902, Pub. L. No. 235, 57th
Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 72, 708 (1902).
130. Id.
131. Virginia has imposed both a personal and corporate income tax since 1843. Virginia Per-
sonal Income Tax, Compilation, 1575, (CCH) 15-005 (Oct. 1988) and Virginia Corporate Income
Tax, Compilation, 1075, (CCH) 10-005 (Sept. 1989).
"Hawaii imposed an income tax as long ago as 1901, while it was still a territory." Hawaii
Income Tax, Compilation, 875, (CCH) 10-002 (Sept. 1987).
J. CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1, § 2 (1973); R. RICE, PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1-4 (1971); C. MCCARTHY, B. MANN, B. AB-
BIN, W. GREGORY; J. LINDGREN, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX; ITS SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS
3-5 (1967).
132. Supra note 19 and 22 and accompanying text.
133. Philippine Islands Temporary Civil Government Act of July 1, 1902, Pub. L. No. 235, 57th
Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 72, 708 (1902). See supra note 127.
134. See infra notes 135-71.
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C. Congress Knew How to Create an Income Tax Exempt Provision
Not only does the language of section 745 and the legislative history
surrounding section 745 indicate that Congress did not intend to exempt
the interest income derived from Puerto Rican obligations from taxation,
but Congress enacted a revenue statute excluding other interest from tax-
ation prior to enactment of section 745. '35 When Congress enacted sec-
tion 745, in 1917, few states had a personal income tax. t3 6 This may lead
one to believe that Congress was unaware of the language required to
cause the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations to be tax exempt
or believed that the taxation of interest income was not possible. How-
ever, the states had ratified the sixteenth amendment' 3 and a valid fed-
eral income tax was in effect, 38 conditions which would hardly have
escaped Congress' notice. Obviously, Congress was well aware of its au-
thority and the language required to exempt the interest derived from
governmental obligations. First, the federal revenue act in effect at the
time Congress enacted section 745 expressly exempted the interest de-
rived from obligations of possessions. Second, the Revenue Act of 1916,
while providing an exemption for the interest derived from United States
obligations, did not provide the same exemption for territories that were
not possessions. Finally, in 1949 and 1950, Congress specifically ex-
empted the interest income derived from the obligations of other territo-
ries, such as the Virgin Islands and Guam.
First, in the Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Congress exempted the interest
derived from United States possessions' obligations, from state and fed-
eral taxation.140 The Revenue Act of 1916, stated that the interest in-
come of the following shall be exempt from taxation: "obligations of a
State or any political subdivision thereof or upon the obligations of the
United States or its possessions."' 4' This statute makes clear that Con-
gress was aware of its authority, its ability, and the possible need to ex-
empt government obligations from federal and state taxation. The
Revenue Act of 1916 indicates that Congress knew how to exempt munic-
135. The Revenue Act of September 8, 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, 64th Cong., 1st Ses. § 4, 758
(1916).
136. G. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 257 (1916) (construing the P.L. No. 271, 64th Cong.,
1st Sess. sec. 4, 758).
137. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
138. The Revenue Act of March 4, 1913, Pub. L. No. 451, 62nd Cong. (1913) and the Revenue
Act of September 8, 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, sec. 4, 758 (1916).
See supra note 22, 23 and accompanying text for other valid income taxes prior to the 1900s.




ipal obligations and the interest derived therefrom from taxation, but
choose not to for Puerto Rican obligations.
Second, while in the Revenue Act of 1916 Congress provided an
income taxation exemption for the interest derived from United States
possessions, Congress did not make the same exemption for territories,
which were not possessions.142 Courts and writers often use the terms
possession and territory interchangeably, 43 but traditionally the two
terms are not the same.'" For example, some scholars would not con-
sider Puerto Rico to be a possession, but rather a territory.
45
The Supreme Court defined a territory under the Constitution and
the laws of the United States, to be an inchoate state:
a portion of the country not included within the limits of any state, and
not yet admitted as a state into the Union, but organized under the
laws of Congress, with a separate Legislature, under territorial gover-
nor and other officers appointed by the President and Senate of the
United States. 146
Further, "a territory is a distinct political society and, therefore, sover-
eign in its action, except as limited by the Organic act[, which states that
a territory's actions are] subject to approval or disapproval by a high
authority. 1 47 The constitution allows states and incorporated territories
to regulate their own concerns and Congress to direct the internal affairs
of an unincorporated territory.
4
However, a possession is a portion of the United States which enjoys
no organized sovereign system of government.149  In re Lane, 50 the
142. HOLMES, supra note 136, at 257.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE POSSESSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES.
Interest paid on the obligations of possessions of the United is exempt. Interest on the
obligations of the territories, or political subdivisions thereof, can be considered as exempt
only on the ground that the territories are possessions of the United States, since the law
does not expressly include territories in the exemption provision.
Id.
143. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Balzac v. Porto [sic] Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922);
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 671 (1945), reh'g denied, 325 U.S. 892 (1945); Gran-
ville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
144. A possession is not a territory, under the generally accepted definition. See supra notes 143-
63 and accompanying text.
145. Green, Applicability of American Laws to Overseas Areas Controlled by the United States, 68
HARV. L. REv. 781, 787 (1955).
146. New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468, 475 (1909) (quoting ex parte Morgan,
20 F. Supp. 298, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1883)).
147. Territory v. Lee, 2 Mont. 124, 133-34 (1874).
"The aim of the... Organic Act was to give Puerto Rico full power of local self-determination,
with an autonomy similar to that of the states and incorporated territories. The effect was to confer
upon the territory many of the attributes of quasi sovereignty possessed by the states-as, for exam-
ple, immunity from suit without their consent." Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 262 (1937)
(footnotes omitted).
148. Lee, 2 Mont. at 133.
149. In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443 (1890).
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court reasoned that, in 1890, Oklahoma was not a territory because "[i]t
had no established or organized system of government for the control of
the people within its limits, as the territories of the United States
have." 151 Similarly, courts have defined the word "possession" as "[t]he
thing possessed, that which anyone occupies, owns or controls."1' 5 2 In
Connell v. Vermilya-Brown Co.,' 53 the court held that an American de-
fense base, leased to the United States on the Bermuda Islands by Great
Britain, would be a possession of the United States as long as the land
was within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States.1
54
When Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1916, Puerto Rico was
a territory rather than a possession. For example, in 1909, in New York
ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 5 5 the accused sued for a writ of habeas corpus,
complaining that the Puerto Rican governor's demand for his return to
Puerto Rico was "insufficient in law" and that the New York authorities
should not detain him.1
56
However, the Supreme Court did not agree. First, section 5278 of
the Revised Statute provided that when an executive authority of any
state or territory demands the return of a fugitive, who has fled the juris-
diction of the demanding state or territory, the executive of the state or
territory to which the fugitive has fled shall arrest and secure the fugitive
and to return the fugitive to the custody of the demanding state or terri-
tory. 5 7 Second, the court reasoned that the organic act of Puerto Rico' 58
provided that the statutory laws of the United States were applicable and
had the same effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States. 59 Third, the
Court found that the organic act of Puerto Rico provided that the gover-
nor of Puerto Rico "shall . . .have all the powers of governors of the
territories of the United States.'' 6°
The Court finally reasoned that the organic act of Puerto Rico gave
150. Id.
151. Id. at 447-48.
152. Crowe v. Elmhurst Contracting Co., 191 Misc. 585, 587, 74 N.Y.S.2d 445, 447 (1947),
aff'd, 273 A.D. 999, 79 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1948). See also Finnan v. Elmhurst Contracting Co., 199
Misc. 1016, 107 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1950).
153. 73 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), rev'd, 164 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1947), aff'd 335 U.S. 377
(1948), reh'g denied, 336 U.S. 928 (1949).
154. Id. at 861.
155. 211 U.S. 468 (1909).
156. Id. at 472.
157. Id. at 472-73 (discussing section 5278 of the Revised Statutes; U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p.
3597.)
158. Id. (referring to 31 Stat. 80, ch. 191 (1900) commonly called the Foraker Act).
159. Id. (citing 31 Stat. 80, ch. 191 sec. 14 (1900) ("except [those involving] the internal revenue
laws, which, in view of the provisions of section three, sh[ould] not have force and effect in Puerto
[sic] Rico")).
160. Id. at 474 (citing 31 Stat. 80, ch. 191, sec. 17 (1900)).
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Puerto Rico the kind of organization required by Ex Parte Morgan 161 to
qualify Puerto Rico as a territory and not simply a possession. 162 Conse-
quently, the Court held that Puerto Rico was a territory under the con-
stitution and the laws of the United States, and therefore the Puerto
Rican governor had every right to demand the return of fugitives who
have fled from Puerto Rico to other states or territories of the United
States.' 63 Since the early 1900's Puerto Rico has been considered a terri-
tory, not a possession. Consequently, when Congress enacted the Reve-
nue Act of 1916 it did not provide a tax exemption for the interest
derived from Puerto Rican obligations.
Finally, in 1949 and 1950,164 Congress specifically exempted the in-
terest income derived from the obligations of other territories, such as the
Virgin Islands and Guam. 65 While these statutes are similar to section
745, they are not identical. When Congress enacted these other territo-
rial statutes, Congress explicitly exempted both the principal and the in-
terest income derived from these territorial obligations by expressly
stating an exemption for both.
Congress enacted the federal statute, section 1574, which dealt with
Virgin Island obligations, in 1949.166 Section 1574 conspicuously states
that
[a]ll such bonds issued by the government of the Virgin Islands or by
its authority shall be exempt as to principal and interest from taxation
by the Government of the United States, or the government of the
Virgin Islands, or by any state [of the United States], Territory, or
possession or by any political subdivision of any state, Territory, or
possession or by the District of Columbia.
167
In addition, one year later, Congress enacted the "Organic Act of
Guam" to provide a civil government for Guam.' 68 Congress included a
provision, 69 which allowed Guam to issue bonds, as it had done for
other territories.'17 0 In section 1423(a), Congress also specifically stated
161. 20 F. 298, 305 (W.D. Ark. 1883).
162. New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468, 476.
"'It may be justly asserted that Porto [sic] Rico is a completely organized territory,
although not a territory incorporated into the United States, and that there is no reason
why Porto [sic] Rico should not be held to be such a territory as is comprised in § 5278."
163. Id.
164. Thirty-two and thirty-three years after Congress enacted section 745. See 48 U.S.C. § 1574
(1988) (formerly 48 U.S.C § 1403 (1949)); 48 U.S.C. § 1423a (1950).
165. Id.
166. 48 U.S.C. § 1574 (1988) (formerly 48 U.S.C § 1403 (1949)).
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. 48 U.S.C. § 1423 (1950).




that the interest arising out of Guam's obligation would be tax exempt.l 7 '
Not only did Congress not expressly provide the same tax exemp-
tion in section 745 that it later provided in section 1574 or section
1423(a), but Congress has had the opportunity to amend section 745, and
has chosen not to.172 Congress' failure to amend section 745 to specifi-
cally exempt the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations supports
the proposition that Congress never intended such interest to be tax-
exempt.
Little, if any, justification exists to demonstrate that Congress was
not aware of the language required to provide an exemption for the inter-
est derived from Puerto Rican obligations when it enacted section 745.
First, when Congress enacted section 745 it had previously provided such
an exemption for United States possessions in the Revenue Act of 1916.
Second, not only did Congress not provide an exemption for the interest
derived from Puerto Rican obligations in section 745, it also did not do
so in the Revenue Act of 1916 because Puerto Rico was not a possession.
One could hardly believe that Congress understood what language was
needed to make an exemption in 1916, forgot in 1917, and reacquired the
understanding in 1949. Finally, Congress has had the opportunity to
amend section 745, but has chosen not to. Congress's failure to amend
section 745 to specifically exempt the interest on Puerto Rican obliga-
tions supports the proposition that Congress never intended such interest
to be tax-exempt.
D. Section 745 and Its Relationship to Section 3124(a)
Courts which have interpreted section 745 have not determined that
Congress intended the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations to
be exempt from taxation. While these courts have identified similarities
between section 745 and section 3124, which exempts United States obli-
gations and the interest derived therefrom from state taxation, they have
not found the interest income taxation exemption of section 3124(a) to be
mandated by section 745. These courts noted that Congress did not indi-
cate an express intent to exempt such interest from state taxation.
Both section 3124(a) and section 745 detail the tax status of govern-
ment obligations. However, section 745 involves Puerto Rican obliga-
171. All bonds issued by the government of Guam or by its authority shall be exempt, as to
principle and interest, from taxation by the Government of the United States or by the
government of Guam, or by any State or Territory or any political subdivision thereof, or
by the District of Columbia.
Id.
172. 48 U.S.C. § 745 was amended in 1950 (64 Stat. 458 (1950)) and 1960 (75 Stat. 245 (1960)).
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tions and 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a) provides a tax exemption for United States
obligations and the interest derived therefrom. Unlike section 745, sec-
tion 3124(a), expressly exempts from state and federal taxation the inter-
est income derived from the obligations it covers. The section 3124(a)
exemption "applies to each form of taxation that would require the obli-
gation, the interest on the obligation, or both, to be considered in com-
puting a tax."' 73 However, section 3124(a)(1) allows states to tax the
interest derived from United States obligations if the state tax is a nondis-
criminatory franchise tax. 174 Similarly, courts have held that section
745, like section 3124(a)(1), allows states to tax the interest derived from
Puerto Rican obligations, if the tax is a nondiscriminatory franchise tax.
However, these same courts have not expanded the similarities of sec-
tions 745 and 3124(a) to imply an exemption for the interest derived
from Puerto Rican obligations from other state or federal income taxes.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, upon noticing the similarity be-
tween section 745 and section 3124(a), concluded that the interest de-
rived from the Puerto Rican obligations was not exempt from their
state's nondiscriminatory franchise tax, 175 but did not extend the tax ex-
emption provided in section 3124(a) to the interest derived from Puerto
Rican obligations.' 76 In Rochester Bank & Trust Company v. Commis-
sioner of Revenue, 77 the Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue obtained
a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the Minnesota Tax Court.
78
The state tax court had held that interest income received by the Roches-
ter Bank and Trust Company on its Puerto Rican bonds did not have to
be included in the bank's taxable net income for purposes of computing
the bank's excise tax.17
9
The Supreme Court of Minnesota disagreed, thereby finding that the
interest earned on the bank's Puerto Rican obligation holdings was sub-
173. 31 U.S.C. 3124(a) (1982).
174. Id. § 3124(a)(1).
175. Rochester Bank & Trust Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 305 N.W.2d 776 (Minn. 1981). The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that section 745 did not exempt the interest derived from Puerto
Rican obligations from the state's non-discriminatory franchise tax, just as section 3124(a) does not
exempt the interest derived from United States obligations from states' non-discriminatory franchise.
A franchise tax is a tax on corporations for doing business in a state, county, or city. The tax is
not an income tax, but is based on the corporation's entire net income. Id.
In addition, a non-discriminatory tax is one that states may impose on holders of federal obliga-
tions or property if the state also impose a equivalent tax on holders of state obligations or property.
The tax is non-discriminatory if the tax is not places no greater "burden on holders of federal prop-
erty than on holders or similar state property." Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S.
392, 397 (1983).
176. 305 N.W.2d at 779.





ject to the Minnesota's nondiscriminatory franchise and excise tax.180 It
analogized section 745 to section 3124(a)(1),' 81 which provides an excep-
tion to the general rule that all United States obligations are exempt from
state taxation.182 Section 3124(a)(1) allows states to tax the interest de-
rived from United States obligations if the tax is a "nondiscriminatory
franchise tax" that is imposed on a corporation doing business in the
state.- 8 3 The Supreme Court of Minnesota extended section 3124(a)'s
exception to the exemption provision to Puerto Rican obligations and
section 745 by implication,18 4 arguing that public policy required the
courts to interpret the two statutes to include the same exceptions to
their exemptions.
8 5
Similarly, the New York State Tax Commission relying on Roches-
ter Bank & Trust Company v. Commissioner of Revenue found section
745 to be similar to section 3124(a)(1). In Federal Insurance Company v.
New York,'8 6 Federal Insurance Company filed for a refund of a New
York franchise tax it paid on its Puerto Rican Bond holdings. 87 The
commission held that interest derived from Puerto Rican bonds had to be
included in the taxpayer's entire net income, for the purposes of deter-
mining a non-discriminatory franchise tax.' 88 The commission reasoned
that all interest derived from state or local bonds was includable, and
that the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations was no excep-
tion.'8 9 Consequently, the commission refused to issue a refund and re-
quired the company to include the $1,624,943 interest earned from its
Puerto Rican obligations in its taxable income for the purpose of arriving
at the company's New York state entire net income. '90
While both courts have recognized the similarities in section 745
and 3124(a), neither court expanded the similarities between section
3124(a) and section 745 to include an income tax exemption for the inter-
180. Id.
181. 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a) (1982).
182. Id.
183. 31 U.S.C. § 3124(aX1) (1982).
184. "Uniformity of treatment of obligations of the United States and its governmental posses-
sions or units has been legislatively assured by the singular treatment embodied in MINN. STAT.
§ 290.08-8 (1978). We therefore, interpret 48 U.S.C. § 745 to include by implication the same excep-
tions contained in 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976) [now 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a)]." Rochester Bank & Trust Co.
v. Comm'r of Revenue, 305 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Minn. 1981).
185. Id.
186. Federal Ins. Co. v. New York, No. TSB-H-82(24)C (File No. 33253), slip op. (State Tax
Comm'n November 15, 1982) (per curiam) (released 1983).
187. Id. at 16883.
188. Id.
189. The New York tax commission relied on Rochester Bank & Trust Co. when interpreting 48
U.S.C. § 745's relationship to 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a). Id. at 16885.
190. Id.
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est derived from Puerto Rican obligations as is provided for the interest
derived from United States obligations in section 3124(a).19 1 While the
Supreme Court of Minnesota reasoned that uniformity is required for the
tax treatment of United States governmental obligations as well as
United States "possessions, agencies or instrumentalities," the court
noted that Congress had not expressed any intent to extend the exemp-
tions of the exception provided in section 3124(a)(1) to section 745.192
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that Congress did not mani-
fest an express intent "that the exemption should extend beyond a prohi-
bition against direct taxation."' 93 The court supported its decision to
extend the exception of section 3124(a)(1) to section 745 based on public
policy and its finding that while Congress had not expressed an intent to
include "in the bank's tax[able] net income of interest earned on Puerto
Rican bonds in the computation of its excise tax,. . . neither is there clear
indication that Congress intended to exclude it."' 194
The Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning is interesting. However,
as has been discussed above, the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that the Constitution places no prohibition against a governmental
body implying a right to tax governmental obligations where Congress
has not expressly limited that right. 195 As logically follows, the same
governmental body is not required to imply an exemption absent express
congressional action. 196 Consequently, congressional failure to provide
an express interest income tax exemption would be enough for states to
tax the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations, but not enough
for Congress to require them to exempt the same interest from
taxation. 97
E. Summary
The evidence is persuasive that Congress did not intend the interest
derived from the Puerto Rican obligations to be tax-exempt. First, the
191. Rochester Bank & Trust Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 305 N.W. 2d 776, 779 (Minn. 1981);
Federal Ins. Co., No. TSB-H-82(24)C (File No. 33253), slip op. (State Tax Comm'n November 15,
1982) (per curiam) (released 1983).
192. Rochester Bank & Trust Co. 305 N.W. 2d at 779.
193. Id.
194. Id. "We do not discern in indicia of Congressional intent, or consideration of public policy,
any basis to support distinctive treatment between obligations of the United States government and
those of its possessions, agencies or instrumentalities."
195. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515-17 (1988); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas
Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365 (1949); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
196. Baker, 485 U.S. at 515-17; Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 336 U.S. at 365; Graves, 306 U.S. 466
(1939).




language of section 745 does not expressly exempt the interest derived
from Puerto Rican obligations and absent legislative or statutory lan-
guage specifically exempting such interest, courts cannot infer a constitu-
tional tax exemption for such income. Second, the legislative history
indicates that Congress did not intend to provide a state tax exemption
for the interest income derived from Puerto Rican obligations. Third,
Congress expressly exempted the interest derived from the obligations
issued by United States possessions in the Revenue Act of 1916, but did
not include the same exemption of the interest in section 745, which Con-
gress enacted one year later. In addition, in similar statutes dealing with
obligations issued by other United States territories, such as the Virgin
Islands and Guam, Congress expressly exempted the interest derived
from these obligations, but has not amended section 745 to provide the
same exemption for the obligations issued by Puerto Rico. Finally,
courts have extended some of the provisions of section 3124(a) to section
745, but have found that Congress did not express an intent to extend all
the provisions of section 3124(a) to section 745. With these issues in
mind, at the time Congress enacted section 745, it had enough experience
exempting interest income from state and federal taxation that had Con-
gress intended to make such an exemption for the interest derived from
Puerto Rican obligations it would have done so.
VI. SECTION 745 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
While the Supreme Court has never expressly held that Puerto Rico
is an incorporated territory, 198 the events that have taken place since
1917 demonstrate that Puerto Rico has been incorporated into the
United States.199 Thus, Congress no longer has the power, under the
constitutional territorial clause,200 to interfere with the states' power to
tax the principal and the interest derived from Puerto Rican obliga-
tions.20 1 The territorial clause grants Congress the power to enact any
198. The Court has never answered the question of whether the bill of rights applies to Puerto
Rican citizens because Puerto Rico is incorporated or because its citizens are citizens of the United
States. Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
599-600 (1976); Torres v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 468-470 (1979).
199. In Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, the Court referred to Puerto Rico as "like a
state." 457 U.S. 1, 7 (1982).
200. U.S CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
201. Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. 73, 82 (1850); Snow v. Dixon, 362 N.E.2d 1052, 1062 (Ill.
1917), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977). The Supreme Court concluded in Dor:
that the power to govern territor[ies], implied in the right to acquire [territories], and given
to Congress in the Constitution in article [IV], § 3, to whatever other limitations it may be
subject, the extent of which must be decided as questions arise, does not require... [Con-
gress] to enact for ceded territor[ies,] not made part of the United States by Congressional
action, a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and that the Constitu-
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necessary law regarding territories.20 2 However, the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted this power to apply without limitations to
unincorporated territories, 20 3 and with limitations to incorporated terri-
tories.2° 4 The Supreme Court has held that incorporated territories are
very similar to states because the entire Constitution is applicable to
them, and therefore, Congress is constrained by the entire Constitution
when enacting laws regarding incorporated territories. 20 5 This Note will
demonstrate that Congress may not constitutionally prevent the states
from taxing other states' obligations 2 6 and, similarly, Congress may not
prevent the states from taxing Puerto Rican obligations because Puerto
Rico has been incorporated, thus, is more like a state207 than simply a
division of the federal government.
Section 745 violates the Constitution. First, federal and state gov-
ernments have the power, under the Constitution, to tax the interest de-
rived from state obligations. Second, states have the power, under the
Constitution, to tax the interest derived from other states obligations.
Third, under certain circumstances states have the power, under the
Constitution, to tax federal obligations and the interest derived there-
from. Finally, Puerto Rico has been incorporated, and therefore, should
be treated more like a state government than a portion of the federal
government. This incorporation qualifies Puerto Rico for state-like treat-
ment and the full protection of the Constitution. Section 745, which at-
tion does not, without legislation [to incorporate the territory] ... carry such right to [any]
territory so situated. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149.
202. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States ......
203. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1982); Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 674, 682-84 (1945); Dorr, 195 U.S. at 145 and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
287-344 (White J., concurring); and Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309 (D.P.R. 1953), aff'd 206 F.2d
377 (1st Cir. 1953).
204. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287-344 (White J., concurring) (Congress must consider the entire
Constitution when enacting laws that effect Puerto Rico, its citizens, and the rest of the Country);
Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1982) (The entire Constitution applies to
Puerto Rico because it is like a state. Therefore, it has the power to regulate its own elections
without Congressional grant); Russmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905), while the Supreme
Court later held that the 6th and 7th amendments of the Constitution do not require states or incor-
porated territories to always provide twelve person juries in criminal actions, Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 91-92 (1970) (the Court in Russmussen held that Congress is subject to the 6th and 7th
amendments when regulating incorporated territories); Mora, 113 F. Supp. at 319 (Congress is sub-
ject to other provisions of the Constitution when regulating Puerto Rico, such as the 5th
amendment).
205. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287-344 (White J., concurring); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic
Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1982); Russmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Mora, 113 F. Supp.
at 319.
206. See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
207. Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 7-8 (The Supreme Court stated "Puerto Rico, like a state, is an
autonomous political entity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution.' ")
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tempts to limit the application of the Constitution to Puerto Rico and
discriminates in favor of Puerto Rican obligations, is unconstitutional.
Thus, states may tax Puerto Rican obligations and the interest derived
therefrom.
A. The Federal Governments Has the Power to Tax the Interest
Derived from State Obligations
In 1895, the United States Supreme Court held, in Pollock v. Farm-
ers' Loan & Trust,20 that the federal government cannot tax the interest
derived from municipal securities. The Court reasoned that the tax
forced the state or local government to borrow on the credit of the
United States and was consequently at odds with the constitutional
scheme. 209 The Court reasoned that a tax on income derived from state
or local government stocks or obligations was a tax on the contract,
210
thereby interfering with the state or local government's power to borrow
money. The Court held that such a tax violated the state and local gov-
ernment's constitutional right of intergovernmental immunity.211
. However, the holding in Pollock has been slowly eroded,212 and was
finally overturned in 1988.213 In South Carolina v. Baker, the Supreme
Court criticized the Pollock holding, by ruling that all interest derived
from bonds was taxable whether the bonds were issued by the federal
government, a state, a municipality, an individual or a private corpora-
tion.214 Further, the Court held that Congress may choose to tax unreg-
istered state obligations and the interest derived therefrom and yet to
exempt from federal taxation registered state obligations and the interest
derived. 215 The Court reasoned that "[tlhe theory... that a tax on in-
come is legally or economically a tax on its source, is no longer
208. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
209. Id; see also Weston v. City Council, 2 Pet. 449, 468 (1829) (The court held that "taxation
on the interest" derived from municipal securities would operate on "the power to borrow before it is
exercised." This would have an influence on the contract and would be "a tax on the power [of the
states and their instrumentalities] to borrow money,. . . and consequently [would be] repugnant to
the constitution.")
210. Pollack, 157 U.S. at 585; Weston, 2 Pet at 469.
211. Pollack, 157 U.S. at 585; Weston, 2 Pet at 469.
212. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939) (state taxation of salaries of
government employees is valid under the Constitution); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938);
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 160 (1937) (While a tax on a government contract
may increase the governments cost the increased cost will not invalidate the tax.).
213. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
214. Id. at 525-27.
215. Id. (federal taxation of the interest derived from unregistered state obligations is constitu-





While, the burden of a nondiscriminatory tax on the income of gov-
ernmental employees or investors who own government property may be
passed back to the government through increased salary rates or higher
interest rates, this burden is a normal incident of doing business in the
same territory in which two governments each possess the power of taxa-
tion. 217 The Constitution presupposes this effect, 218 "owners of state
bonds have no constitutional entitlement not to pay [federal] taxes on
income they earn from state bonds, and States have no constitutional
entitlement to issue bonds paying lower interest rates than other issu-
ers."' 219 Consequently, the rationale that the taxation of income derived
from governmental property is a direct tax on the governmental body is
no longer valid. Rather, after Baker, the Constitution allows the federal
government to tax state obligations, as long as all states are affected
equally. 2
20
B. States Have the Power to Tax Other States Obligations
Further, not only can the federal government tax state obligations,
but the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not prohibit
states from taxing the bond issues of other states because to do so would
interfere with the taxing power possessed by each state. 22' The Constitu-
tion grants the states the power to tax the income of its citizens through
the Tenth Amendment 22  and this power is an essential element of the
sovereignty of each state.2
23
216. Id. at 523 (citing Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939)).
217. Graves, 306 U.S. at 487.
218. Id.
219. Baker, 485 U.S. at 524-25.
220. Id.
221. In Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592 (1881), the Court answered the question whether
the registered public debt of one State was exempt from taxation by the debtor State, or could be
taxed there and whether the income and debt was taxable by another State when owned by a resident
of the latter State. The court held "[w]e know of no provision of the Constitution of the United
States which prohibits such taxation.... [In addition the court] conceded that no obligation of the
contract of the debtor State is impaired." Id. at 524.
222. "The power of the State legislature to levy and collect taxes is unrestricted where such tax is
not otherwise unconstitutional." Snow v. Dixon, 362 N.E.2d 1052, 1062 (Ill.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
939 (1977).
223. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) ("[tlhe Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
require a State to apply another State's law in violation of its own legitimate public policy.") Conse-
quently, each state may tax the principal and interest income derived from another state's obliga-
tions, if held by its citizens, even if the other state exempts its bond principal and the interest derived
therefrom from its own taxation. Id. at 421-22.
Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881). "The debtor State is in no respect [the
property holder's] sovereign, neither has it any of the attributes of sovereignty as to the debt it owes,
except such as belong to it as a debtor." Id. at 595.
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The Tenth Amendment, which grants the states powers that are not
specifically enumerated, 224 is still valid.2 25  In Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Authority,226 the Court overruled National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery,227 by holding that states are not entitled under the tenth
amendment to exclusively regulate traditionally state functions. How-
ever, the court indicated that unenumerated "limits on the Federal Gov-
ernment's power to interfere with state functions" undoubtedly exist.228
For example, in Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, the Court held
that Puerto Rico, like the states, was entitled to regulate its own election
system and process, as long as such regulations do not restrict Puerto
Rican citizens' access to the electoral process or discriminate among vot-
ers or political parties, as guaranteed by the Constitution. 229 Similarly,
the Supreme Court has held that the states' power to tax its citizens ex-
ists under the Constitution.
230
The tenth amendment of the Constitution grants the states the
power to tax the income of its citizens231 and little if any federal power
under the Constitution can impair this exercise of state sovereignty. 23
2
No one questions that the power to tax all property, business, and per-
sons, within their respective limits, is original in the States and has
never been surrendered. [However,] [i]t cannot be so used, indeed, as
to defeat or hinder the operations of the National government; but it
will be safe to conclude, in general, in reference to persons and State
corporations employed in government service, that when Congress has
not interposed to protect their property from State taxation, such taxa-
tion is not obnoxious to that objection.
233
While the Constitution's tenth amendment does not allow states to
ignore express congressional regulation of interstate commerce, federal
property, state taxation of federal and state obligations, property, con-
224. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
225. Even after Garcia, "[although the tenth amendment is moribund, it is by no means dead."
Constitutional Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 200 (1982); see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985) (While the federal government can regulate most traditional state
functions, limits on the federal power may exist); Snow v. Dixon, 362 N.E.2d 1052, 1062 (Ill.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977) (In this relatively recent decision, the court held that the state power of
taxation has been left to the states through the tenth amendment.)
226. 469 U.S. at 547.
227. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
228. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547; see also Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7-9.
229. 457 U.S. at 11.
230. Thomson v. Pacific R.R., 76 U.S. 579, 591 (1869); Snow, 362 N.E.2d at 1062.
231. "The power of the State legislature to levy and collect taxes is unrestricted where such tax is
not otherwise unconstitutional." Snow, 362 N.E.2d at 1062.
232. Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. 73, 82 (1850).
233. Thomson, 76 U.S. at 591.
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tracts, or other traditionally state functions, 234 the Constitution does not
authorize Congress the power to place these regulations in a discrimina-
tory manner.235 Consequently, Congress does not have the power to give
Puerto Rico, which has been incorporated, any state, or any other incor-
porated territory a more favorable bond issue provision than it grants
any of the other fifty states of the United States.236 Similarly, holders of
Puerto Rican237 obligations should be subject to the same taxes as hold-
ers of other state obligations.
C. States Have the Power to Tax the Interest Derived
from Federal Obligations
Even, if Puerto Rico has not been incorporated and is still a portion
of the federal government, states may still have the authority to tax the
principal and the interest derived from Puerto Rican bonds. While the
Supreme Court has held that the federal government has the power to
tax state obligations and the interest derived therefrom,238 and that states
have the power to tax the interest derived from the obligations of other
states, 239 the Supreme Court has also held that under certain circum-
stances states have the power, under the Constitution, to tax federal obli-
gations and the interest derived therefrom.
24
0
Under the constitutional rule of governmental tax immunity estab-
lished in McCulloch v. Maryland,241 "[s]tates may not impose taxes di-
rectly on the Federal Government, nor may they impose taxes the legal
incidence of which falls on the Federal Government." 242 Congress codi-
fied this constitutional rule in section 3124(a) of the United States
Code.243 Over the years, the Supreme Court has expanded its holding in
234. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-558 (1985).
235. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 524-25 (1988).
236. During congressional hearings Senator Harding noted "(t]hat [exempting bonds from fed-
eral and state tax] is a provision that is not granted to any state in the Union," and consequently may
be discriminatory. H.R. 9533, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 CONG. REc. 4810 (1917).
Compare Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554 (San Antonio mass transit "faces nothing more than the same
minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of thousand of other [public] employers...
have to meet."); Baker, 485 U.S. at 526-27 (state obligations are not constitutionally exempt from
federal taxation); Nathan, 49 U.S. at 82.
237. This note will demonstrate that Puerto Rico which is more like a state government than the
federal government. See Part V, section C.
238. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
239. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592 (1881).
240. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392, 397 (1983).
241. 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
242. Memphis Bank & Trust, 459 U.S. at 397, (quoting United States v. County of Fresno, 429
U.S. 452, 459 (1977)).
243. 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a) (formerly § 742) (1982). Section 3124(a) is generally regarded as a
restatement of the Constitutional rule laid out in McCulloch v. Maryland. Memphis Bank & Trust,
459 U.S. at 397.
[V/ol. 66:903940
PUERTO RICAN OBLIGATIONS
McCulloch to bar not only direct taxes on the federal government, but
also indirect taxes. Under these holdings the Court stated that any tax
on the income derived from federal or state property, obligations, and
contracts was exempt from state taxation, even if the property, obliga-
tion, or contract was held by a private individual or association.
244
However, later cases have overruled these expansive holdings,
thereby, modifying the Court's interpretation of McCulloch.2 45 Today,
the Supreme Court has recognized that absent congressional statutory
action to exempt United States obligations from taxation by all states,
states may tax the obligations and the interest derived from these federal
obligations. 246 In Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner,247 which in-
volved a state tax on income derived from federal obligations, the Court
acknowledged that the constitution and section 3124(a)(1), under the
correct circumstances, allowed states to impose a tax on the interest de-
rived from federal obligations.2 48 The Supreme Court ruled that state
taxation of the interest derived from federal bonds was not barred by the
Constitution as long as the tax did "not discriminate against holders of
federal property or those with whom the Federal Government deals."
249
244. "The reasons for exempting all the property and income of a state, or of a municipal corpo-
ration, which is a political division of the state from federal taxation, equally require the exemption
of all the property and income of the national government from state taxation." Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan Trust, 157 U.S. 429, 585 (1885), overruled by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (a
federal tax on of income derived from municipal property was unconstitutional because the tax on
the income was the same as a tax on the property); "It cannot be denied (and denial is not at-
tempted) that bonds of the United States are beyond the taxing power of the states," Northwestern
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 136, 140 (1927) (the Constitution implies an exemption for
the interest derived from federal obligations).
245. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 520-22 (discussing Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939)); Memphis Bank & Trust v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392, 397 (1983); Helver-
ing v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (The court upheld a state sales tax imposed on a government
contractor even though the financial burden of the tax was passed on to the Federal government);
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (The fact that a tax on a government contract
would increase the cost to the Government is not a legitimate reason to invalidate the tax). See also
Thomson v. Union Pacific R.R., 76 U.S. 579, 587-88, (1869) (State governments have the authority,
under the Constitution and absent Congressional legislation, to tax the property of private corpora-
tions doing business under federal contract.)
246. Memphis Bank & Trust Co., 459 U.S. at 392.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 397 (referring to 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a), which the Court holds is a restatement of the
constitutional rule imposed by McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316 (1819). The Court recognized
that if the state tax qualified under the exception provided by § 3124(aX1), the states were free to tax
the interest derived from the federal obligations); section 3124(aXl) provides that the exemption
extends to every form of taxation, "except nondiscriminatory franchise or .. .other nonproperty
taxies] [in lieu thereof] imposed on . .. corporation[s], and [except] estate [taxes] or inheritance
tax[es]." 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a)(1) (1976).
249. "Indeed, this Court has in effect acknowledged that a holder of a government bond could
constitutionally be taxed on [federal] bond interest ... " South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 526
(1988) (interpreting Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392 (1983)). When "the eco-
nomic but not the legal incidence of the tax falls upon the Federal Government, such a tax generally
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However, under the Constitution "[a] state tax that imposes a greater
burden on holders of federal property than on holders of similar state
property impermissibly discriminates against federal obligations. ' 250
Consequently, states have the authority, under the Constitution and sec-
tion 3124(a)(1) to place a nondiscriminatory tax on federal obligations
and the interest derived, but seldom follow through with such taxes.
Under section 745, Congress has not taken the steps required to ex-
empt Puerto Rican obligations and the interest derived therefrom from
state taxation. As discussed earlier, Congress has failed to express an
intent to exempt the interest derived from state taxation. However, if
Puerto Rico is determined to only be a portion of the federal government
and not an incorporated territory, and Congress amends section 745 to
expressly exempt the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations from
state taxation, any state, which taxes not only the obligations and the
interest derived from federal obligations, but also taxes the principal and
the interest derived from their own state obligations, may tax the interest
derived from Puerto Rican obligations.
251
The majority of the states, however, do not tax the principal or in-
terest derived from obligations issued by their own state, but do tax the
principal and the interest derived from other states' obligations. 252 Con-
sequently, a tax imposed by these states on the principal or interest de-
rived from any federal obligations, including Puerto Rican obligations,
would create a greater burden on holders of federal obligations than on
holders of similar state obligations. Therefore, such a tax would be dis-
does not violate the constitutional immunity if it does not discriminate against holders of federal
property or those with whom the Federal Government deals." Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Gar-
ner, 459 U.S. 392, 397 (1983).
Baker, 485 U.S. at 521 (discussing Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 62 (1941) (So long as
the state tax on the contractor was nondiscriminatory and is for the costs of the materials to the
government, the tax is "but a normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two
independent taxing sovereignties." The governments asserted right to be free from taxation by the
another government does not spell immunity from paying the added cost, attributable to the taxation
of those who furnish supplies to the government and who have been granted no tax immunity.))
250. Memphis Bank & Trust Co., 459 U.S. at 397.
251. In Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), the Court held that while tax
exemption could not be implied by the Constitution, Congress had the authority to exempt federal
obligations from state taxation, but only if Congress acted affirmatively. Id. at 480.
Currently, Congress does not exempt the interest derived from United States obligations from a
nondiscriminatory state franchise tax. 31 U.S.C. sec. 3124(aXI) (1982). In addition, courts have
similarly interpreted Section 745 to not exempt the interest derived from Puerto Rican obligations
from such nondiscriminatory state income tax or franchise tax. Rochester Bank & Trust Co. v.
Comm'r of Revenue, 305 N.W. 2d 776, 779 (1981); Federal Ins. Co. v. New York, No. TSB-H-
82(24)C (File No. 33253), slip op. (State Tax Comm'n November 15, 1982) (per curiam) (released
1983).
252. See supra note 49. The Court in Bonaparte, recognized that "The only agreement [the
states had made] as to taxation was that the debt should not be taxed by the State which created it."
Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881).
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criminatory tax, which would be in violation of the Constitution and sec-
tion 3124 of the United States Code.
253
On the other hand, states which tax the principal and the interest
derived from their own obligations, would have the power and the right,
under the Constitution, to tax the principal or interest derived from Pu-
erto Rican obligations because the tax would not discriminate against
federal property holders.
254
However, as will be discussed in section D of this part of the Note,
the Constitution does not consider Puerto Rico to be more like the fed-
eral government than a state government. Rather the Constitution con-
siders Puerto Rico to be incorporated into the Union.255 Congress
cannot interfere with a state's autonomy to decide whether or not to tax
obligations of other states and likewise Congress cannot interfere with a
state's freedom to tax the principal or the interest derived from Puerto
Rican bonds held by its citizens.
D. Puerto Rico Is Incorporated
Congress may not constitutionally prevent the states from taxing an-
other states obligations or the interest derived therefrom. 256 Similarly
Congress may not prevent the states from taxing Puerto Rican obliga-
tions because Puerto Rico has been incorporated, and therefore, is more
like a state257 than simply a division of the federal government.
Prior to the enactment of the Organic Act of Puerto Rico on March
2, 1917 and prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in the "Insular
Cases," of the early 1900s, the Court held that unincorporated territories
and possessions were entitled to the protection of the entire Constitu-
253. Memphis Bank & Trust Co., 459 U.S. at 397-99 (1983). "Our decisions have treated § 742,
[codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a) (1982)] as principally a restatement of the constitutional rule,"
which exempts federal obligations from discriminatory taxation, but does not exempt such obliga-
tions or the interest derived from discriminatory taxation.
254. Id. at 397.
255. Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309 (D.P.R. 1953), aFfid 206 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1953) (Con-
gress is subject to other provisions of the Constitution when regulating Puerto Rico, such as the 5th
amendment). Compare Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1982) (Puerto
Rico, like a state, has the authority under the Constitution to fill vacancies that occur in legislative
and other elective positions).
256. Bonaparte, 104 U.S. at 594; Thomson, 76 U.S. at 591 (1869). Compare South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 526-27 (1988). The Baker Court determined that a congressional imposed tax
on unregistered state obligations did not interfere with states sovereignty because the tax was not
discriminatory. "[A] nondiscriminatory federal tax [or exemption] on the interest earned on state
bonds does not violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine." Rather an exemption or tax
for some state obligations over other states obligations would be discriminatory. Id.
257. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1982) (Puerto Rico, like a state,
has the authority under the Constitution to fill vacancies that occur in legislative and other elective
positions).
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tion.258 However, by the early 1900s, the Supreme Court had changed its
position.259 The "Insular Cases ''26° established that the Constitution,
other than the territorial clause, does not automatically apply to unincor-
porated territories or possessions. 26t The Court held that Congress must
incorporate the territory or possession before Congress is limited by all
other provisions of the Constitution in its regulation of and legislation for
the United States property. 262 Today, courts have predominately utilized
the "Insular Cases'" 263 to determine the application of the Constitution to
territories and possession.
264
At the time the "Insular Cases" were decided the United States had
recently conquered and acquired Puerto Rico. 265 Years later, when Con-
258. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 13, n.24 (1957) (referring to Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343
(1898); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
259. Reid, 354 U.S. at 12-14.
260. In Dorr v. United States 195 U.S. 138 (1904), the court reasoned that congressional power
to govern and legislate for territories acquired by the United States, under the territorial clause, U.S.
CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2., is an inevitable consequence of the right to acquire and to hold territories.
The usage of this power begins with the our military occupation of the territory and continues
throughout the territories relationship with the United States. However, Congress' power to regu-
late will vary depending on the extent of that relationship. As long as the territory remains unincor-
porated congressional power to regulate the territory will extend without limitations. Id. at 141-42.
However, once Congress has incorporated the territory into the United States or the territory be-
comes a state, congressional power to legislate for territories is limited by all other provisions of the
Constitution. Id. at 142-45.
[I]n common with all the other legislative powers of Congress, it finds limits in the express
prohibitions on Congress not to do certain things; that, in the exercise of the legislative
power, Congress cannot pass an ex post facto law or bill of attainder; and so in respect to
each of the other prohibitions contained in the Constitution.
Id. at 142. See also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287-344 (1900) (White J., concurring).
261. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 142.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (While Puerto Rican citizens'
right to vote is protected by the Constitution, under the Constitution, Puerto Rico like a state is
entitled to chose the structure of its Commonwealth's electoral system.); Examining Bd. of Engi-
neers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-600 (1976); Torres, 442 U.S. at
468-70 (1979); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 674, 682-84 (1945).
However, the Reid Doctrine, decided in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), held that the Consti-
tution does not require territories or possessions to be incorporated before the full Constitution will
apply to them, but rather the Constitution must always apply or the benefits of the Constitution will
be destroyed. Reid Doctrine cases are distinguished from the "Insular Cases" in that the Reid Doc-
trine cases involve limitations on Congressional power to interfere with an individual's American
citizenship. The court's reasoned that once an individual is a citizen of the United States, that
individual should be entitled to the full protection of the Constitution regardless of the relationship
that exists between the United States and the territory in which the individual lives. Where as the
"Insular Cases" "involve the power of Congress to provide rules and regulations to govern
temporar[y] territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions." Id. at 13-14. Congres-
sional regulation of a state's power to tax its citizens would hardly be considered Congressional
regulation of an individual's right of citizenship, rather such regulation would be considered Con-
gressional regulation of the states' sovereign authority. Compare South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S.
505, 526-27 (1988) (Congress may tax the interest earned on South Carolina's unregistered obliga-
tions and not interfere with state's sovereignty because the tax is nondiscriminatory).
265. Reid, 354 U.S. at 13-14.
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gress enacted section 745, Puerto Rico was still an unincorporated terri-
tory of the United States.266 In 1922, in Balzac v. People of Porto Rico,
267
the Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury for
either a civil or a criminal trial. The Court held that the Sixth and Sev-
enth Amendments did not apply to citizens of Puerto Rico because Pu-
erto Rico was an unincorporated territory.268 Congress did not expressly
incorporate Puerto Rico, therefore, the court reasoned that incorporation
should not be "assumed without express declaration, or an implication so
strong as to exclude any other view."
'269
However, in a similar case, Rassmussen, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that if the unincorporated territory was incorporated into the
United States the entire Constitution would become applicable to it and
the defendant would be entitled to the protection of the sixth and seventh
amendments, even without congressional grant.
270
To determine whether section 745 is unconstitutional because Con-
gress incorporated Puerto Rico and, therefore, is limited by the entire
Constitution in its capacity to regulate or legislate for Puerto Rico this
Note will examine two issues: first, whether Congress incorporated Pu-
erto Rico; and second, if Congress did incorporate Puerto Rico whether
a statute such as 48 U.S.C. § 745 is unconstitutional and outside the con-
gressional power because section 745 is in violation of states' constitu-
266. In Balzac, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), the Court found that Congress had not incorporated Puerto
Rico when it enacted The Organic Act of Puerto Rico of March 2, 1917. Id. at 306-13 (1922).
Similarly, the Court in Downes considers Puerto Rico to be "a territory appurtenant and belonging
to the United States, but not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the United
States Constitution." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
267. 258 U.S. at 298.
268. The courts have ruled that federal statutes and provisions that discuss possession of the
United States are applicable at a jury trail in criminal and civil cases against citizens of territories of
the United States. "But it is just as clearly settled that they do not apply to [a] territory belonging to
the United States which has not been incorporated into the Union." Id. at 304-5.
269. Id. at 306. The court further reasoned that because Congress provided a separate Bill of
Rights in the Jones Act for Puerto Rico, which did not include the rights of the sixth and seventh
amendments, that Congress could not have intended to incorporate Puerto Rico. However, the
Court did acknowledge that absent any other countervailing evidence, a law of Congress or a provi-
sion in a treaty acquiring territory, declaring an intention to confer political and civil rights on the
inhabitants of the new land as American citizens, may be properly interpreted to mean an incorpora-
tion of [the territory] into the Union, as in the case of Louisiana and Alaska. Id. at 309 (referring to
Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 520-21 (1905)).
270. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 520-21 (1905) (Because Alaska was an incorpo-
rated territory of the United States the court held that the criminal defendant was entitled to a jury
trial that comported with requirements of the 6th and 7th amendments.) Unlike Balzac the defend-
ant in Rassmussen was entitled to a jury trial that comported with the requirements of the 6th
amendment, because Alaska had been incorporated into the United States. See also Balzac, 258 U.S.
at 309 (referring to Rassmussen and Dorr, 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904) (the Court acknowledged that
express incorporation is not necessary when the territory and the citizens living there do not have the
cultural differences with that of the citizens of the United States.))
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tional right to tax its citizens, granted under the tenth amendment and
state's sovereignty power.
1. Did Congress Incorporate Puerto Rico
To determine whether Congress incorporated Puerto Rico this Note
will explore three areas: (1) whether Congress made Puerto Rico an in-
dependent commonwealth by the compact between the United States and
Puerto Rico, in 1950; (2) whether Puerto Rico fits the definition of an
incorporated or unincorporated territory, and (3) whether the Supreme
Court has held that Puerto Rico is like a state.
a. The Compact of 1950
On July 3, 1950, Congress enacted a compact with Puerto Rico, 271
which one may argue incorporated Puerto Rico into the United States
under Public Law number 600.272 Since the 1950's, courts have held that
Puerto Rico is no longer a dependent territory or possession of the
United States, but rather an incorporated territory and common-
wealth. 273 The "Insular Cases" mandate that when a territory, such as
Puerto Rico, is incorporated the entire Constitution, not only the territo-
rial clause, is applied to that territory. 274 Further, courts have held that
once a territory is incorporated and no longer a dependant possession,
Congress cannot ignore the other provisions of the Constitution when
legislating for the territory.275
In Mora v. Torres,276 the district court held and the First Circuit
affirmed that the fifth amendment no longer applied to Puerto Rico "on
the basis that Puerto Rico [was] a possession, dependency or territory
subject to the plenary power of Congress .... ",277 Rather the fifth
271. "Fully recognizing the principle of government by consent, section 731(b) to 731(E) or (e)
of this title are now adopted in the nature of a compact so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize
a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption." 48 U.S.C. § 731(b) (1950) (empha-
sis added).
272. Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309 (D.P.R. 1953), aff'd, 206 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1953).
273. Id. See also, Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979).
274. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1982); Examining Bd. of Engi-
neers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-600 (1976); Torres, 442 U.S. at
468- 470 (While the Court acknowledged that the Insular cases are still applicable in determining the
application of the Constitution to incorporated or unincorporated territories the Court failed to
determine whether Puerto Rico was incorporated or not); Hooven & Allison Co., 324 U.S. 652, 674,
682-84 (1945); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 145 (1904); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
287-344 (1900) (White J., concurring); Mora, 113 F. Supp. at 309 (the district court found and the
appellate court affirmed that Puerto Rico has been incorporated).
275. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287; Balzac, 258 U.S. at 306-313; Mora, 113 F. Supp. at 309 (the
district court found and the appellate court affirmed that Puerto Rico has been incorporated).




amendment applied to Puerto Rico through the compact granted by
Congress.278 The Court reasoned that the Puerto Rican government is
no longer an agency of the United States, nor does the United States
exercise its power over Puerto Rico through the delegation of the Federal
Government, but rather that Puerto Rico has been incorporated by com-
pact with the United States.
279
Similarly, Alaska was acquired by treaty established by the action of
Congress. In Rassmussen v. United States,280 the Court held that con-
gressional action combined with the reiterated decisions of this Court
indicated that Alaska had been incorporated into the United States. The
Court found that the doctrine settled as to unincorporated territory in
the "Insular Cases" is inapposite and lends no support to the contention
that Congress in legislating for Alaska had the authority to violate the
express commands of the 6th amendment.281  The Court reasoned that
even though the treaty did not expressly incorporate Alaska or specifi-
cally grant Alaskan citizens the protection of the sixth amendment, be-
cause Alaska was incorporated, the Constitution automatically inferred
this right on the citizens of Alaska.
2 82
Where [the] territory is part of the United States the inhabitants
thereof were entitled to the guaranties of the 5th, 6th, and 7th Amend-
ments, and that the act or acts of Congress purporting to extend the
Constitution were considered as declaratory merely of a result which
existed independently by the inherent operation of the Constitution.
283
The Court reasoned that once a territory is incorporated into the United
States, Congress is bound by the entire Constitution, not simply by the
territorial clause.
284
Because Congress created a compact with Puerto Rico, and the
Supreme Court treats such action as implying a territory's incorporation
into the United States, the entire Constitution now applies to Puerto
Rico. Thus, the mere fact that Congress, through the language of the
278. Congress has relinquished its plenary power to make all needful rules and regulations for
Puerto Rico, by granting the people of Puerto Rico a compact. Id.
279. Under the compact Puerto Rico has been incorporated into the United States. Now Puerto
Rico enjoys the total right of self government, which is incompatible with the pervious status of
Puerto Rico as a possession, dependency or unincoorporated territory. Id. at 313-14.
280. 197 U.S. 516, 525 (1905).
281. Id. at 520-21.
282. Id. at 527.
283. Id. at 526.
284. Id. at 525. In Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 671 (1945), the Court held that
"Congress is not subject to the same constitutional limitations," when legislating for areas that are
not united with the United States by incorporation, as Congress is limited when "legislating for the
United States," or its states. Id. at 674. In addition, the court held that the incorporated territories
are entitled to government under all provisions of the Constitution, rather than only by grant of
Congress under article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution. Id. at 682 (Reed, J. dissenting).
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compact and section 745,285 attempted to preclude states from exercising
their taxing power under the tenth amendment, is not in and of itself
enough to say that Puerto Rico is not incorporated or that Congress is
not limited by the entire Constitution.
b. The Definition of an Incorporated Territory
Second, to determine whether Puerto Rico is a territory which has
been incorporated into the United States, the Note will discuss the defini-
tion of an incorporated territory. An incorporated territory is one that
the federal government intends to joined into the Union as a state. 28 6 In
addition, an incorporated territory is one which Congress has created a
compact with.287 On the other hand, an unincorporated territory of the
United States belongs to the United States, but is not constitutionally
united with it.288
First, an incorporated territory is one that the federal government
intends to joined into the Union as a state. Congress and the President
have made it clear that they would admit Puerto Rico into the union
should the citizens of Puerto Rico request statehood. 28 9 In an interview
done in early 1990, the Bush administration indicated that it was behind
efforts to bring Puerto Rico in as a state.29° While not every congres-
sional leader agrees that Puerto Rico should be a state, a vast majority
are in favor of statehood for Puerto Rico and believe that Puerto Ricans
should be given the choice as whether to join the Union as a state or
not. 29 ' Consequently, Puerto Rico meets the first requirement to be in-
285. 48 U.S.C. § 731(b) (1950); 48 U.S.C. § 745 (1917).
286. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 8, n. 12. Congress has indicated that statehood is the destiny of
all "incorporated territories" or possessions.
287. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1900); Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306-313
(1921).
288. Hooven & Allison Co v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 671, 674 (1945); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
289. Campbell, Bush Administration Stands Behind Statehood for Puerto Rico, The Bond Buyer,
April 27, 1990, at 4; see also Nash, Panel Backs Bill on Puerto Rico Vote, The N.Y. Times, Septem-
ber 27, 1990, at A 13 (The House approved a bill to put a referendum on the Puerto Rican September
16, 1991 ballet.)
The referendum will allow Puerto Rican citizens to chose between "enhanced" Commonwealth
status, statehood or independence. Ronald Walker, spokes person for resident commissioner Jaime
Fuster, said that the referendum has broad bipartisan support including endorsement of President
Bush and Speaker of the House Tom Foley. Greenway, [Puerto Rico] States News Service, Septem-
ber 20, 1990.
290. Campbell, Bush Administration Stands Behind Statehood for Puerto Rico, The Bond Buyer,
April 27, 1990, at 4.
291. In a thirty-seven to one vote, Marlenee, Congressman from Montana, "was the only mem-
ber on the House Interior Committee this week to oppose holding a referendum in the Caribbean
Commonwealth to see if the majority of its citizens favor statehood." Montana would lose one of its
representatives if Puerto Rico, which has a population of 3.6 million, more than four times that of
Montana, became a state. Greenway, States News Service, September 20, 1990.
The other Montana Congressman, Pat Williams, also stated that he reservations about Puerto
[Vol. 66:903
PUERTO RICAN OBLIGATIONS
cluded among the incorporated territories of the United States.
Second, Congress created a compact with Puerto Rico in 1950.292
The term "commonwealth" was presented to the people of Puerto Rico to
describe the meaning of the compact:
293
[In contemporary English [commonwealth] means a politically organ-
ized community ... in which political power resides ultimately in the
people, hence a free state, but one which at the same time [is] linked to
a broader political system in a federal or other type of association and
therefore does not have an independent and separate existence.
294
The word "commonwealth" clearly defines the relationship created under
the terms of the "compact" between the people of Puerto Rico and the
United States.295 Puerto Rico's status with the United States is "that of a
state[,] which is free of superior authority in the management of its own
local affairs[,] but which is linked to the United States of America and
hence is a part of its political system in a manner compatible with its fed-
eral structure.' 296 The constitution allows states of the Union, as it does
incorporated territories, to regulate their own concerns, but Congress
must direct the internal affairs of a unincorporated territory.
297
Puerto Rico fits the definition of an incorporated territory because
Congress and the President intend to join Puerto Rico into the Union as
a state and Puerto Rico carries commonwealth status.
c. Puerto Rico Is Like a State
Third, the Supreme Court has held that Puerto Rico is like a State.
In Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party,298 the Court found that the
Puerto Rican legislature, like any state legislature, could vest in one
political party the power to fill an interim vacancy in the Puerto Rico
Legislature. 299 The Court reasoned that Puerto Rico, like a state, "is an
autonomous political entity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled by the
Constitution.' 300 Consequently, the Court found that "[tihe methods
by which the people of Puerto Rico and their representatives have chosen
Rico becoming a state, but he voted for the referendum because he believes Puerto Rican citizens
should decide this issue. Id.
292. 48 U.S.C. § 731 (1950).
293. Mora, 113 F. Supp. at 315-16.
294. Id. at 316 (quoting statements by Governor Luis Munoz Matin in Resolution No. 22, Con-
stitutional Convention of Puerto Rico, 426- 458) (emphasis added).
295. Id.
296. Id. (emphasis added).
297. People of Puerto"Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 262 (1937).
298. 457 U.S. 1 (1982).
299. Id. at 4.
300. Id. at 8 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (quoting
Mora v. Mejias, 115 F. Supp. 810 (D.P.R. 1953))).
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to structure the Commonwealth's electoral system are entitled to sub-
stantial deference," just as similar laws chosen by state legislatures are
granted great deference.30 In addition, the Court acknowledged that
Puerto Rico's Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute must be ac-
corded great weight, as statutory interpretations made by state Supreme
Courts. 30 2 The Court further reasoned that "[a]bsent some clear consti-
tutional limitation Puerto Rico [like a state] is free to structure its polit-
ical system to meet its "special concerns and political circumstances.
'303
While each citizens right to vote is protected by the Constitution, no
provision under the Constitution "expressly mandates the procedures
that a state or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico must follow in filling
vacancies in its own legislature. ' ' 30 4  No provision exists under "the
United States Constitution or any of its amendments which either ex-
pressly or impliedly dictates the method a State must use to select its
Governor. 30 5 Puerto Rico, like a state, is afforded constitutional rights
and deference to regulate its own commonwealth.
Similarly, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,306 the
Supreme Court has held that Puerto Rico was entitled to the complete
protection of the Constitution and that Congress is limited by the Consti-
tution when enacting laws for Puerto Rico. The Court stated that Puerto
Rico had similar needs as that of a state.307
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,308 the Supreme
Court has held that the entire Constitution applied to Puerto Rico and
that Congress was limited by the Constitution when enacting laws for
Puerto Rico. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the appellee
argued that he was unconstitutionally denied due process of the law, in-
301. Id. at 8-12 (Puerto Rico like other states has the authority to fill legislative vacancies in a
method that "plainly serves the legitimate purpose of ensuring that vacancies are filled promptly,
without the necessity of the expense and inconvenience of a special election" as long as the method
employed "does not fall disproportionately on any discrete group of voters, candidates, or political
parties.") Id. at 12.
302. Id. at 13. "Moreover, we should accord weight to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's assess-
ment of the justification and need for particular provisions to fill vacancies caused by the death,
resignation, or removal of a member of the legislature." Id. at 8.
303. Id. at 13-14 (quoting Garcia v. Barcelo, 671 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1982).
304. Id. at 7-8.
305. Id. at 9 (quoting Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 243 (1966) (The Court relies on Justice
Black's statements concerning the states power under the Constitution to regulate its own election as
support for its holding that Puerto Rico, which is like a state, also has the power under the Constitu-
tion to regulate its elections.)
306. 416 U.S. 663, 671 (1974). See also Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors
v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
307. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 671; Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors,
426 U.S. 572. See infra notes 308-13 and accompanying text.
308. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). See also Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors v.
Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
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sofar as the Puerto Rican statutes authorized the appellants, the Superin-
tendent of Police and the Chief of the Office of Transportation of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, to seize the appellee's yacht without no-
tice or hearing and thereby, unconstitutionally deprived the appellee of
its property without just compensation. 30 9 The Puerto Rican three-judge
district court heard the case and agreed. Puerto Rican officials appealed
to the Supreme Court.
310
The United States Supreme Court, in affirming the district court's
decision, granted direct appeal based on 28 U.S.C. § 2281, which allows
any party to appeal "an order granting or denying.., an ... injunction
in any civil action ... [which is] required by any Act of Congress to be
heard and determined by a district court of three judges. '311 The Court
reasoned that Puerto Rican legislation, like that of state legislation,312 is
subject to review by the federal courts created by Article III of the Con-
stitution. Further, the Court reasoned that because Puerto Rico's needs
are similar to those a state, Puerto Rican statutes, like state statutes, may
need to be reviewed by the Supreme Court when constitutional questions
arise. 
3 13
While section 745 does not require or prohibit Puerto Rico or its
citizens from any action or from enjoying the benefits of the Constitu-
tion, the idea that Congress has unlimited power to enact such laws may.
In addition, section 745 definitely interferes with the fifty states right to
tax its citizens. The argument that section 745 is good for Puerto Rico
does not override its unconstitutional nature. With the benefits of incor-
porated territory status come obligations and duties to the rest of the
country.
Congress has incorporated Puerto Rico. First, Congress created a
compact between Puerto Rico and the United States, which fully incor-
porates Puerto Rico into the United States. Congress has labeled Puerto
Rico an independent commonwealth free to manage its local affairs. Sec-
ond, Congress and the Presidential administration of the United States
intend to give Puerto Rico the chance to join the Union. Finally, the
Supreme Court has held that Puerto Rico is like a state, consequently, it
is entitled to and subject to the protection of the entire Constitution.
309. Caldero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 665-68.
310. Id. at 669.
311. Id. 669 and 670, n.7.
312. Id. (emphasis added).
313. Id; U.S. CONST. art III.
1990]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
2. Is Congress Limited by the Tenth Amendment When Enacting
Legislation for Incorporate Territories
Because Congress has incorporated Puerto Rico we must determine
whether a statute such as 48 U.S.C. § 745 is unconstitutional and outside
the congressional power because section 745 is in violation of states' con-
stitutional right to tax its citizens, granted under the tenth amendment
and states' sovereignty power. The Court has never directly address the
issue of whether the tenth amendment and states' right of sovereignty are
provisions which Congress is to be limited by when enacting legislation
for incorporated territories. However, the "Insular Cases" indicated that
Congress is limited by all provisions of the Constitution when enacting
laws for incorporated territories. 314 In addition, the Court indicated it
did not restrict Congress when enacting legislation for unincorporated
territory, although it did require Congress to consider the entire Consti-
tution when enacting legislation for incorporated territory, so as to facili-
tate a smooth transition for these unincorporated territories from their
old form of government to the United States' form.
315
The Court believed immediate adaptations of the entire Constitution
to unincorporated territories may be too painful and create bitter divi-
sions among the citizens of the unincorporated territory and the citizens
of the United States.316 In Dorr, the court reasoned that Congress
needed the power to establish laws for unincorporated territories without
regard to other provisions of the Constitution in order to facilitate the
transition from a Spanish government to the government recognized in
the United States.317 In other words, Congress should not be hampered
by other provisions of the Constitution when establishing laws for an
unincorporated territory if the laws are unknown and unsuited for the
territory's and its peoples' needs. 318 However, once Congress has incor-
314. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142 (1904). This is affirmed in the Supreme Court's
later decisions. See Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7 (1982); Torres V. Puerto
Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 468-470 (1979); Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors, 426
U.S. 572, 599-600 (1976); Hooven & Allison Co., 324 U.S. at 674, 682-84 (1945).
315. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 148-49.
318. Id. (Citizens of unincorporated territories are not entitled to jury trials and Congress is not
required to provide jury trails to unincorporated territories.)
[I]f the United States shall acquire by treaty the cession of territory having an established
system of jurisprudence, where jury trials are unknown, but a method of fair and orderly
trial prevails under an acceptable and long-established code, the preference of the people
must [not be] disregarded, their established customs [not] ignored, and they themselves
[should not be] coerced to accept, in advance of incorporation into the United States, a




porated the territory, the territory and its citizens are entitled to and
must accept the Constitution as its guidance for government. 319
When Congress enacted the Jones Act, it did not incorporate Puerto
Rico, but rather keep Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory to al-
low it time to adjust to the new ways and laws of the United States.
Likewise, when Congress enacted section 745, it did so to assist Puerto
Rico in obtaining the necessary loans required to develop and join the
rest of the United States in economic strength.320 However, Puerto Rico
has had 73 years to develop, to grow, and to adjust to the culture and
legal system of the United States so that it might join and compete with
the rest of the United States. In addition, while Puerto Rico is not at-
tached to North America, the transportational difficulties of the early
1900s no longer exist. People from both Puerto Rico and the United
States are able to freely immigrate back and forth, as United States citi-
zens do from one state to the other. Thus, none of the barriers prevent-
ing incorporation that were present in 1917 exist today. As discussed
above, while Congress did not expressly state that Puerto Rico was incor-
porated, when it granted Puerto Rico and its citizens commonwealth sta-
tus in 1950, Congress has apparently incorporated Puerto Rico. 321
Consequently, it is time for Puerto Rico to embrace the United States
Constitution.
Congress has attempted to grant Puerto Rican obligations special
tax treatment under the compact of 1950 and section 745,322 but these
statutes ignore selected sections of the Constitution. In Dorr, the court
indicated that once a territory was incorporated all provisions of the con-
stitution would apply, thus, Congress can no longer ignore the constitu-
tional mandates of the tenth amendment and states sovereignty when
enacting legislation for Puerto Rico. Instead, Congress must consider
these provisions when creating legislation for Puerto Rico, as Congress
would if enacting legislation that would involve one of the fifty states. 323
319. Id.
320. Supra note 46. See also Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309-310 (1921) (the Jones Act,
of 1917, and the treaty acquiring Alaska, referred to in Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516
(1905), are different because, unlike the Philippines or the Puerto Rican island, Alaska was an enor-
mous territory, sparsely settled, offering opportunity for immigration and settlement by American
citizens. Alaska was also attached to the North American continent and within easy reach of the
United States. In addition, incorporation involved none of the difficulties presented in incorporation
of Puerto Rico or the Philippines, as referred to in Dorr.)
321. 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319, 320, sec. 5 (July 3, 1950) (codified at 48 U.S.C.
§ 731 et. seq); see supra notes 256-313 and accompanying text.
322. Id; and 48 U.S.C. § 745 (1917).
323. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 141 (1904); See also Arkansas, supra note 10, where
the Arkansas taxing commission recognizes that Puerto Rican obligations and the interest derived
therefrom are no longer entitled to the tax exemption status potentially provided by Section 745
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Similarly, Congress cannot require states to exempt the principal
and the interest derived from selected states' or incorporated territories'
obligations, thereby exempting state obligations from taxation in a dis-
criminatory manner.3 24 Such an exemption would be tantamount to a
discriminatory exemption for holders of one state's obligations and the
interest derived therefrom over another. Congress obtained its power to
rule and regulate Puerto Rico and other unincorporated territories from
the territorial clause of the United States Constitution. 325 However, once
a territory is incorporated into the United States, Congress is not only
obligated to enact rules and regulations for that territory, but must also
respect the limits of other provisions of the Constitution.326 Section 745
is unconstitutional because it interferes with states' power of taxation
under the tenth amendment.
The Court has indicated that Congress cannot enact regulations for
incorporated territories that violate any other provision of the constitu-
tion.327 In addition, the Court has held that the Constitution does not
prohibit a state from taxing the principal or interest derived from the
obligations of other state obligations. 328 "In our dual system of govern-
ment[s], the position of the state as sovereign over matters not ruled by
the Constitution requires a deference to state legislative action beyond
that required for the laws of a[n] [unincorporated] territory. ' 329 Conse-
quently, section 745, which provides a discriminatory exemption for
holders of Puerto Rican330 obligations over holders of other state obliga-
tions interferes with the states' power to regulate its citizens under the
tenth amendment.
In summary, Puerto Rico is no longer a simply a temporary and
because Puerto Rico is now a commonwealth and an incorporated territory. "The District of Co-
lumbia is a U.S. possession, thus its obligations are exempt, but not those of Puerto Rico, because the
latter is an independent commonwealth."
324. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S 505, 526-27 (1988); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Gar-
ner, 459 U.S. 392 (1982); Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. 82 (1850) (state taxation of federal obliga-
tions or contracts and the interest derived, therefrom is valid under the constitution, unless the state
does not tax similar state or local income derived from a similar state obligation or contract. This
type of tax would be discriminatory and in violation with the constitution. 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a).)
325. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cI. 2.
326. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1982); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442
U.S. 465, 468-470 (1979); Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores De
Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-600 (1976); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 674, 682-84
(1945); Dorr, 195 U.S. at 145 and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287-344 (1900) (White J.,
concurring); Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309 (D.P.R. 1953), aff'd, 206 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1953).
327. Rassmussen United States, 197 U.S. 516, 520-21 (1905).
328. Baker, 485 U.S. at 526-27; Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881).
329. Stainback v. MoHock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 378 (1949).
330. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1982) (the Supreme Court stated




dependent territory331 of the United States', rather Puerto Rico has been
a territory of the United States for over 73 years. 332 Puerto Rico no
longer needs protection from drastic changes and major cultural conver-
sions from a Spanish form of government to a American form. Congress
has incorporated Puerto Rico, and therefore, can no longer use the terri-
torial clause to dictate to states legislation that violates another provision
of the Constitution. Incorporated territories are entitled and must em-
brace the full Constitution.
While, incorporated territories should be given the respect of states,
they should not be protected by Congress as unincorporated territories
are. In addition, states are sovereign within their respective territories; it
follows that they may impose what taxes they think proper upon persons
or things within their dominion. 333 While the tenth amendment does not
totally protect states from regulation of traditionally state activities, the
Constitution does protect states from discriminatory regulations by the
federal government. As discussed, states have the power to tax the inter-
est derived from other state obligations as well as federal obligations.
334
Similary, congressional application of the territorial clause of the Consti-
tution to Puerto Rico no longer need interfere with states' rights under
the tenth amendment. Section 745, which attempts to exempt Puerto
Rican bonds from state taxation creates a discriminatory regulation by
Congress and therefore, should be held unconstitutional.
VII. CONCLUSION
Puerto Rican obligations and the interest derived can be subject to
both state and federal taxation. First, Congress did not intend to extend
the obligation tax exemption provided for in 48 U.S.C. § 745 to the inter-
est derived from the Puerto Rican bonds. Second, the Congress has in-
corporated Puerto Rico, thus, the Constitution and the courts have
turned away from treating Puerto Rico as a dependant territory. Conse-
quently, the need for Congress to utilize the constitutionally granted
power of art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 is diminished. 48 U.S.C. § 745 which attempts
331. Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309 (1953), aff'd 206 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1953).
332. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7 (1982); Examining Board of Engi-
neers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-600 (1976); Torres v. Puerto
Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 468-470 (1979); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 674, 682-84
(1945); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 145 (1904) and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287-
344 (1900) (White J., concurring).
333. Ohio Life. Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. 428 (1853).
334. Southern Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 526-27 (1988); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v.
Garner, 459 U.S. 392, 397 (1982) (states can tax federal obligations as long as the tax does not
impermissibly discriminate against holders of federal property over holders of state property).
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to exempt Puerto Rican bonds from state taxation should be held uncon-
stitutional and any attempt to extend the statute to include the interest
derived therefrom should be struck down. This statute violates the
states' Tenth Amendment power to determine what should be included
in the states' taxable income because it discriminates in favor of a state-
like territory over other states of the United States.
Thus, both the history and the language of 48 U.S.C. § 745, coupled
with the states' power to determine whether to tax various items, leads
one to the conclusion that the states may tax the interest on Puerto Rican
bonds. In addition, barring the limited unfairness to Puerto Rican bond
issuers and investors, the need for states to exercise their full power of
taxation must overrule any rationale used by Congress to authorize ex-
empting these obligations' principal or the interest derived therefrom,
from taxation. Consequently, the interest derived from the Puerto Rican
obligations should not be tax exempt.
